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Government Liability for Unconstitutional Land Use
Regulation
STEWART E. STERK*
INTRODUCTION

Government officials at all levels, from policemen to Supreme Court Justices
and the President, regularly make decisions that implicate constitutional questions. No single remedy or set of remedies is available for all cases in which
decisions by government officials violate constitutional rights. Sometimes, as
when "political questions" are involved, official violations of constitutional
rights are beyond judicial redress; the only remedy is at the polling booth.'
Other times, the unconstitutional action will be "undone" or given no effect
2
by the courts. Thus, a statute regulating protected speech will be invalidated; 3
trial.
at
excluded
be
will
evidence obtained as a result of police misconduct
Still other times, those injured by unconstitutional official action can recover
entity.
or from a governmental
damages, either from the official responsible
5
4
Civil liability under the Civil Rights Act is an example.
6
In Williamson County Regional PlanningCommission v. Hamilton Bank,
a landowner is seeking money damages against the county government to
remedy allegedly unconstitutional restrictions imposed on his land by a county ordinance. The Supreme Court has agreed to hear this term an appeal by
the county challenging a jury award of $350,000 to the landowner. Thus, the
Court will once again consider whether the Constitution imposes liability on
municipalities for the effects of their unconstitutional land use ordinances.
7
Three years ago, in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego,
the Court declined to resolve the issue. The California courts had limited injured landowners to declaratory and injunctive relief. 8 Although a majority
* Professor of Law, Benjamin Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. A.B. 1973,
J.D. 1976, Columbia University.
I am indebted to many of my colleagues, particularly David Carlson, Stephen Diamond, John
Hanks, Arthur Jacobson, and Richard Singer for incisive criticism of earlier drafts. I am also
grateful to Heidi Bettini, Kim Gordon, Janice Neale, and Jonathan Spanbock for their helpful
research assistance.
1. See Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1973).
2. See Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
3. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
5. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
6. 729 F.2d 402 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 80 (1984).
7. 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
8. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 272-74, 598 P.2d 25, 28-31, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 372, 374-75 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
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of the Supreme Court held the order of the court below nonfinal and declined
to address the issue, 9 at least four Justices were willing to hold that the California courts could not, consistent with the Federal Constitution, deny the remedy
of money damages to landowners subjected to unconstitutional land use
ordinances. 'I0
Awarding damages as a remedy can serve two distinct purposes. Sometimes
damage awards reflect a judgment that an injured party is deserving of compensation, even if the injuring party did not, in the decisionmaker's judgment, act wrongfully, and even if the decisionmaker does not want to
discourage the activity that resulted in the injury." Thus, a manufacturer may
be strictly liable in tort for injuries caused by product defects that could not
have been prevented even by the exercise of due care.'"
Frequently, however, the legal order 13 uses a damage remedy not so much

to compensate injured victims but to influence behavior by imposing on potential actors the threat of liability for their actions. For example, converters

are required to disgorge their "unjust enrichment" even if the victims of their
activities have suffered no injury or only nominal injury. 4 The legal order

also attempts to influence behavior by awarding treble damages for certain
statutory violations."'

Even when a damage remedy is intended primarily to compensate injured
victims, it may nevertheless influence people to behave in a manner that reduces
the possibility of liability. Although this form of behavior modification is

sometimes desirable, the threat of liability may discourage behavior that deci9. 450 U.S. 621, 633 (1981).
10. Id. at 653 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Stewart, Marshall, and Powell, JJ.). See
also id. at 633-34 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in result, but "agreeing with much of what is said
in the dissenting opinion").

11. See generally Fletcher, Fairnessand Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARv. L. REv. 537 (1972)
(for an analysis that focuses on the "corrective justice" basis for tort law).
12. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63-64, 377 P.2d 897,
901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963); Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 340-41, 298 N.E.2d 622,
627-28, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 468 (1973) (noting, however, that "to impose this economic burden
...should encourage safety"). See generally Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1119-24 (1969).
13. Scholars in the Critical Legal Studies movement, among others, question the existence
of a legal order in which "doctrine reflects a coherent view about the basic relations between
persons." See, e.g., Trubek, Where the Action Is: Critical Studies and Empiricism, 36 STAN.
L. RiEv. 575, 577-78 (1984). One can even agree that doctrine as a whole is a mass of contradiction, but still conclude that a particular decisionmaker has selected a particular rule to further
one policy rather than another. See, e.g., Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1685, 1963-94 (1976) (lawmaker who awards punitive damages
or specific performance "indicates that he is not indifferent as between the courses of action
open to the parties").
14. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 927 comment f (1977); RESTATEMENT OF REsTrruTION

§§ 151 comment f, 157, 202 (1937).

Of course, merely requiring disgorgement provides no strong incentive not to convert; it only
removes some of the incentive to convert. In that sense, denying converters unjust enrichment
is not nearly as likely to influence behavior as are punitive or treble damages.
15. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982) (antitrust suits by persons injured).
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sionmakers consider useful. As a result, damages are appropriate to remedy
a particular type of injury only if the social desire to compensate injured victims outweighs the negative social consequences, if any, that result from the
alteration of behavior caused by the threat of damage liability.
Resolution of the question raised in Hamilton Bank then, requires analysis
both of the deprivation landowners would suffer if they were left without
a damage remedy when subjected to unconstitutional ordinances, and of the
potential social consequences of discouraging government behavior through
imposition of damage liability. This article undertakes that analysis. Before
doing so, it examines, in sections I and II, the doctrinal foundation for the
argument that the Constitution "requires" that a damage remedy be available.
Section I focuses on the "takings" cases, and section II discusses the broader
range of cases in which unconstitutional activity by municipal officials has
resulted in damage liability. Sections III and IV address the policy questions.
Section III focuses on the fairness aspects of a damage remedy, while section
IV examines the effects a damage remedy is likely to have on governmental
decisionmaking processes.
The analysis in those sections leads to a number of conclusions. First, so
long as declaratory and injunctive relief are available, it is not generally unfair to deny money damages to landowners subjected to unconstitutional ordinances. Second, awarding damages to landowners would not be likely to
increase the efficiency of land use. Third, the threat of municipal damage
liability for enactment of unconstitutional ordinances would probably cause
municipal officials to engage in more extensive evaluation of constitutional
issues. However, because municipal officials are not, as a group, well-suited
for constitutional decisionmaking, damage liability is likely to deter enactment of constitutional and socially desired ordinances while producing little
gain in constitutional enforcement.
Finally, section V synthesizes the preceding discussion and expresses the
conclusion that municipal damage liability for enactment of unconstitutional
land use ordinances is generally unwise. The synthesis suggests, however, that
when an unconstitutional ordinance results not from official uncertainty about
constitutional law, but from municipal attempts to delay or discourage vindication of established constitutional rights, the policy reasons for denying
a damage remedy are not applicable, and municipal damage liability is
appropriate.
I.

"TAKINGS"

LAW: THE DOCTRINAL FRAMEwoRK

In concluding that money damages should be available to landowners injured by enactment of unconstitutional land use regulations, Justice Brennan, writing for the dissenters in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of
San Diego, characterized the question as one involving "express constitutional
guarantees," and therefore, one not to be determined by resort to policy
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judgments.1 6 The doctrinal foundations on which Justice Brennan's assertions
rest merit some exploration. 7
A.

The DoctrinalArgument for Damages

If money damages were not available to those injured by unconstitutional
land use regulation, other remedies would remain. First, a landowner could
assert the constitutional violations defensively in a proceeding to enforce an
ordinance against him. Relying upon that remedy, of course, would present
substantial risk to a landowner uncertain about the constitutionality of an
ordinance. 8 But two other remedies, the declaratory injunction and the writ
of mandamus, can provide the landowner with relief from the offending regulation without running the same risk. The landowner would, however, have
to bear the cost and delays of litigation.
Concluding that these traditional remedies were insufficient to meet constitutional standards, the dissenters in San Diego Gas proposed a constitutional rule requiring a government entity that has enacted an unconstitutional
regulation to pay interim damages to affected landowners. 19 That is, the government entity must "pay just compensation for the period commencing on the
date the regulation first effected the 'taking,' and ending on the date the
government entity chooses to rescind or otherwise amend the regulation.""0
The doctrinal argument advanced by the dissenters can be summarized
simply. First, the Supreme Court said in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon:2
"[t]he general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.""
16. 450 U.S. 621, 661 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
17. Two articles in a recent land use symposium discussed the remedies issue. See Cunningham, Inverse Condemnation as a Remedy for "'RegulatoryTakings," 8 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 517 (1981); Mandelker, Land Use Takings: The Compensation Issue, 8 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 491 (1981). See also Bosselman & Bonder, PotentialImmunity of Land Use ControlSystems
from Civil Rights and Antitrust Liability, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 453 (1981).
Other recent commentary includes Blume & Rubinfeld, Compensationfor Takings: An Economic
Analysis, 77 CALIF. L. REv. 569 (1984); Sallett, The Problem of MunicipalLiabilityfor Zoning
and Land Use Regulation, 31 CATH. U.L. REv. 465 (1982); Note, Just Compensation or Just

Invalidation: The Availability of a Damages Remedy in ChallengingLand Use Regulations, 29
UCLA L. REV. 711 (1982).
18. The principal risk would be that, in a proceeding to enforce the ordinance, a court would
conclude that the ordinance did not violate the Constitution, and would require the landowner
to remove any prohibited improvements and to cease further construction. Such a conclusion
might cause both out-of-pocket expense and contract liability to contractors and other parties
with whom the landowner dealt.
19. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 653 (1981) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
20. Id.
21. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
22. Id. at 415. Statements of similar character have been made in a number of subsequent
cases. Cited by Justice Brennan in San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 648-49, were PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979);
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174 (1979); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,
369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962); United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958).
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The Cases

In San Diego Gas, Justice Brennan identified Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon27 as the source for the proposition that the just compensation clause
restrains government power to enact land use restrictions. In Pennsylvania
Coal, homeowners, relying upon a state statute that prohibited all coal mining
that would cause subsidence of dwellings on the surface, sued to enjoin a
coal company from mining in a way that caused subsidence of their home.
However, more than forty years before enactment of the statute the coal company had executed a deed, on which the homeowners' title was based, conveying the surface, but expressly reserving the right to remove all coal under
the surface, and expressly imposing on the grantee the risk of damage that
might arise from mining the coal. The Supreme Court concluded that the
statute was unconstitutional as applied to the parcel in question and lifted
an injunction awarded by the Pennsylvania courts.28
In the course of his opinion, Justice Holmes stated that "[t]he general rule
at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." 29 Despite that much-quoted
language,3" the Pennsylvania Coal opinion is, for two reasons, a less-thancompelling foundation for the argument that the constitutional restraint on
land use regulation is located in the just compensation clause.
First, Justice Holmes never characterized the challenged ordinance as an
exercise of the eminent domain power. In fact, he indicated that the legislature's
use of its police power in PennsylvaniaCoal offended the due process clause,
not the just compensation clause.3
Second, except when issues of remedy are involved, the source of the constitutional protection has little practical importance. But in Pennsylvania Coal,
remedy was not an issue; damages were not sought, and they were not awarded.
The coal company asked only to have the injunction lifted, and that is all
it received.
27. 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (cited by Justice Brennan in San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 649).
28. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 416.
29. Id. at 415.
30. Justice Holmes' use of the oft-quoted phrase is explained when one recognizes that the
Pennsylvania Coal opinion was a response to the proposition that exercise of the police power
to protect the health, morals, or safety of the public can never exceed constitutional bounds.
The proposition was developed most extensively by Justice Harlan writing for the Court in Mugler
v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887), and served as the basis for the dissent by Justice Brandeis
in Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 417-18, 420-21. The thrust of Justice Holmes' opinion in
PennsylvaniaCoal, and of the language so often quoted, was to establish the contrary principle
that there are constitutional limits on the legislature's power to regulate land use, even when
a public purpose for the regulation exists.
Professor Sax has compared in detail Justice Harlan's view with Justice Holmes' contrasting
philosophy. See Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 38-46 (1964).
31. Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property
could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law.
As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must
yield to the police power. But obviously the implied limitation must have its limits,
or the contract and due process clauses are gone.
260 U.S. at 413.
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Second, in other cases not involving invalid regulation, the Court has said
that the just compensation clause2 3 is self-executing and that compensation
may be due even if the government never institutes formal condemnation
proceedings. 4 Consequently, if an invalid regulation "goes too far" and
becomes a "taking," the just compensation clause by its own terms requires
the payment of money damages as compensation for the taking.
The dissenters' syllogism, however, is not immune from attack. Although
the Supreme Court has established that the Constitution protects landowners
from some forms of restrictive regulations, the 'Court's decisions do not
establish that the constitutional protections are embodied in the just compensation clause of the fifth amendment. Instead, the protections against confiscatory regulation could be derived just as easily from the due process clause. "5
Thus, the doctrinal argument would run, confiscatory regulation is an abuse
of governmental police power in violation of the due process clause. The regulation is not itself a "taking" in violation of the just compensation clause, but
if government chooses, it can maintain the otherwise unconstitutional regulation by "taking" property and paying compensation in the exercise of its eminent domain power. 26 This doctrinal argument is as consistent with existing
precedent as the one advanced by the dissenters in San Diego Gas.
One might reasonably ask why it matters what constitutional provision
restrains government power to regulate land use, so long as the restraints are
embodied in the Constitution somewhere. It matters only if one believes, with
the dissenters in San Diego Gas, that once a regulation is deemed to be a
"taking," the just compensation clause requires a particular remedy: payment of just compensation. If, on the other hand, a regulation is invalid
because it violates the due process clause, no constitutional provision requires
any particular remedy. The state courts, within limits established by the
Supreme Court, would be free to fashion remedies that take appropriate account of the policy concerns involved.
Given the alternative of locating the restraints on power to regulate land
use in the due process clause, it is curious, at least, that the dissenters in San
Diego Gas would choose an alternative source that they believe precludes consideration of the policy concerns that might make one remedy preferable to
another. As a prelude to discussion of those policy concerns, the remainder
of this section briefly examines the existing doctrinal framework to demonstrate
that the conclusions drawn by Justice Brennan in his San Diego Gas dissent,
although not without support, are not inescapable.
23. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
24. See United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980); Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S.
13, 16 (1933).
25. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
26. The New York Court of Appeals, in Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York,
39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976), identified the due process clause as
the source of constitutional protection against overly restrictive land use ordinances. See infra
notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
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PennsylvaniaCoal was decided four years before Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co.,' 2 in which the Supreme Court first sustained a local zoning ordinance against constitutional attack and thereby set the stage for vast expansion of local land use regulation. Since Ambler Realty, the Court has invalidated a land use ordinance in only one case, Nectow v. City of Cambridge.33
In Nectow, the attack on the zoning ordinance was framed not in "taking"
terms, but as a fourteenth amendment deprivation of property without due
process. 4 As a remedy, the landowner sought not compensation, but a mandatory injunction directing city officials to disregard the zoning ordinance
in passing on his building permit application. The Supreme Court held that
"the action of the zoning authorities comes within the ban of the fourteenth
' 35
amendment and cannot be sustained.
In both Pennsylvania Coal and Nectow there was no dispute over the
remedy, the only issue for which it might be important to determine the source
of the constitutional right involved. Neither case, then, is persuasive authority for locating the constitutional restraint on land use regulations in the just
compensation clause or, for that matter, in the due process clause. To the
extent that the language used by the Court is significant, the Court in Pennsylvania Coal combined the famous "taking" language with express citation
of the due process clause; in Nectow, the Court relied only upon the due
36
process clause.
Although no land use regulations have been invalidated since Nectow, the
dissent in San Diego Gas cited a selection of the cases in which the Court
had found "takings" and awarded compensation even though no formal condemnation proceedings had been instituted. 7 These were cases in which governmental action resulted in physical invasion or alteration of land or the airspace
above it. But, Justice Brennan reasoned, "[p]olice power regulations such as
zoning ordinances and other land-use restrictions can destroy the use and enjoyment of property in order to promote the public good just as effectively
as formal condemnation or physical invasion of property. ' 38
In these physical invasion or alteration cases, however, as in Pennsylvania
Coal and Nectow, neither the parties nor the Court focused on the question
32. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
33. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
34. Id. at 185.

35. Id. at 189.

36. In Necrow, the Court emphasized that a zoning restriction "cannot be imposed if it does

not bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare." 277
U.S. at 188. The language used is very similar to that used to invalidate other regulatory measures
in the group of "substantive due process" cases decided during the same period. Compare Nectow,
277 U.S. 183, with Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929) (state statutes fixing price
of gasoline held unconstitutional because gasoline not "affected with a public interest") and
Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270 U.S. 402, 414 (1926) (state prohibition on use of "shoddy"
in bedding and furniture held unconstitutional because "the provision in question cannot be
sustained as a measure to protect health").
37. 450 U.S. at 651-55.
38. Id. at 652 (footnote omitted).
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of remedy. 39 Issue was joined on the constitutionality of government action,
not on the remedial consequences of deeming the government action a "taking." The implicit assumption was that if the government action was unconstitutional, compensation would be paid, just as the implicit assumption
in Pennsylvania Coal and Nectow was that the remedy would be invalidation
of the offending ordinance."0 These physical invasion and alteration cases,
then, are also inadequate authority for the proposition that regulations, if
confiscatory in effect, fall afoul of the fifth amendment's just compensation
4
clause. 1
Finally, two recent cases in which the Court sustained local land use regulations, Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York 4 " and Agins
v. City of Tiburon,4 are also inconclusive. In neither case did the Court reach
the issue of remedy, and only in a somewhat obscure footnote in the Penn
Central opinion did the Court venture to conclude "we do not embrace the
proposition that a 'taking' can never occur unless government has transferred
physical control over a portion of a parcel.'" The Court, however, did not
trace the implication of its footnote for the remedial problem, nor did it indicate that New York would have been compelled to provide a monetary
4
remedy if the ordinance had been held unconstitutional. '
The purpose of this survey has been only to demonstrate that the Court
has not "bound" itself to one constitutional source or the other for restraints
on land use regulations, not to demonstrate doctrinal error in locating protection in the just compensation clause. It bears note, however, that two of
39. See, e.g., Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v. Dickinson,
331 U.S. 745 (1947); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Jacob v. United States,
290 U.S. 13 (1933). All of these cases were cited by Justice Brennan in San Diego Gas, 450
U.S. at 651-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
40. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), presents a contrast to the other physical
invasion cases cited in the San Diego Gas dissent. The United States sought to enjoin Kaiser
Aetna from excluding the public from a marina that Kaiser Aetna had dredged and made accessible to a navigable waterway. Although the Court concluded that "the Government's attempt to create a public right of access to the improved pond goes so far beyond ordinary regulation or improvement for navigation as to amount to a taking under the logic of Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon," 444 U.S. at 178, the Court did not award damages to Kaiser Aetna. Instead, it held only that
if the Government wishes to make [the pond] into a public aquatic park . . . it
may not, without invoking its eminent domain power and paying just compensation, require them to allow free access to the dredged pond while petitioners' agreement with their customers calls for an annual $72 regular fee.
Id. at 180.
41. See also Cunningham, supra note 17, at 538-39.
42. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
43. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
44. 438 U.S. at 125 n.25.
45. The footnote might, however, have been a response to the doctrine that the New York
Court of Appeals had elaborated in Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39
N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976). That doctrine suggests that an onerous
land use restriction might be a violation of the due process clause, but not the just compensation
clause, and therefore no compensation would be available. See also infra text accompanying
notes 59-63.
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the nation's more respected state courts, the California Supreme Court and

the New York Court of Appeals, have dealt with the issue extensively, and
have not interpreted the Supreme Court precedents to establish that restraint
on governmental power to regulate land use emanates from the just compensation clause. Both courts have traced the constitutional protections against
onerous land use regulations to the due process clause, and both courts have
denied damages, limiting the remedies available to landowners aggrieved by

unconstitutional ordinances to declaratory and injunctive relief.
The issue first reached the California Supreme Court in 1975, in HFHLtd.
v. Superior Court." Plaintiffs brought an inverse condemnation action seeking damages for a decline in land value resulting from rezoning. The California Supreme Court sustained a demurrer to plaintiff's complaint, indicating
that mandamus, not inverse condemnation, was "the proper remedy" for arbitrary or discriminatory zoning.47 The court also held that interim damages

were not available for "the period between the enactment of the challenged
ordinance and its demise.""' Quoting Justice Jackson's statement that "[o]f

course, it is not a tort for government to govern,"4 9 the court found it "[d]eeply rooted in the theory of our polity" that the remedy for improper legisla-

tion is a mandate action to undo the governmental action.

0

The court in HFH, however, did reserve judgment in a footnote on "the

question of entitlement to compensation in the event a zoning regulation

forbade substantially all use of the land in question." 5 ' Relying on that footnote, the District Court of Appeal, in Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto,S concluded that a damage remedy was available to redress the city's unconstitutional designation of plaintiff's land as "permanent open space and conser' 53
vation lands.
46. 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976).
47. Id. at 513, 542 P.2d at 241, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 369.
48. Id. at 518, 542 P.2d at 244, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 372.
49. Id. at 519, 542 P.2d at 244, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 372 (quoting Dalehite v. United States,
346 U.S. 15, 57 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting)).
50. 15 Cal. 3d at 519, 542 P.2d at 244, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 372.
51. Id. at 518 n.16, 542 P.2d at 244, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 372 (emphasis in original).
52. 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976).
53. Id. at 617, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 577. In concluding that a damage remedy was available,
the Eldridgecourt relied upon three categories of cases. First, the court cited opinions containing
dictum to the same effect as Justice Holmes' famous statement that "if regulation goes too
far it will be recognized as a taking." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415
(1922). See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962); Dahl v. City of Palo
Alto, 372 F. Supp. 647, 648 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Brown v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 385
F. Supp. 1128, 1132 (D. Nev. 1973); Turner v. County of Del Norte, 25 Cal. App. 3d 311,

315, 101 Cal. Rptr. 93, 96 (1972). In none of these cases did the courts award money damages.

In the second category are airplane overflight cases in which landowners have been awarded
damages against municipalities operating adjacent airports. Aaron v. City of Los Angeles, 40
Cal. App. 3d 471, 115 Cal. Rptr. 162, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1974); Peacock v. County
of Sacramento, 271 Cal. App. 2d 845, 77 Cal. Rptr. 391 (1969); Sneed v. County of Riverside,
218 Cal. App. 2d 205, 32 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1963). In these cases, the landowner objected not to
regulatory activity, but to physical interference amounting to a trespass or a nuisance and causing substantial diminution in the value of the land. The physical interference was sometimes,
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The Eldridgecase generated controversy,5" and the California Supreme Court

went out of its way to disapprove it in Agins v. City of Tiburon." In Agins,
a two million dollar inverse condemnation action, the court concluded that
the zoning ordinance at issue did not deprive plaintiffs of any constitutional

rights,56 a conclusion subsequently affirmed by the United States Supreme
Court. The bulk of the opinion, however, was directed at plaintiff's damage
claim." In disapproving Eldridge and attempting to clarify its opinion in HFH,
the court reached beyond the issues presented in Agins to conclude that a
landowner aggrieved by an unconstitutional zoning ordinance, though deprived
of substantially all use of his land, "may not ... elect to sue in inverse
condemnation and thereby transmute an excessive use of the police power

into a lawful taking for which compensation in eminent domain must be
paid."

5 8

The New York Court of Appeals in Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City
of New York,5" also concluded that the due process clause, not the just compensation clause, is the source of constitutional protection against confiscatory
land use regulation. There, plaintiff sought damages for losses suffered as
a result of a zoning amendment that designated land for use as a "Special
Park District." The Court of Appeals declared the amendment invalid, but

but not always, supported by a zoning ordinance imposing height restrictions on the landowner's
right to develop.
The third category of cases cited by the court in Eldridge involves government action that
diminishes the value of land as a prelude to eminent domain proceedings. See Arastra Ltd. Partnership v. City of Palo Alto, 401 F. Supp. 962 (N.D. Cal. 1975), vacated, 417 F. Supp. 1125
(N.D. Cal. 1976); Gisler v. County of Madera, 38 Cal. App. 3d 303, 112 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1974);
People ex rel. Dep't of Public Works v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 33 Cal. App. 3d 960, 109
Cal. Rptr. 525 (1973); Klopping v. City of Whittier, 8 Cal. 3d 39, 500 P.2d 1345, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 1, (1972).
54. See Hall, Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto: Aberration or New Direction in Land Use Law?,
28 HAsTINGs L.J. 1569 (1977); Note, Sizing Up Just CompensationRelief for Down-Zoning After
HFH and Eldridge, 10 U.C.D. L. REv. 31 (1977). See also Willemsen & Phillips, Down-Zoning
and Exclusionary Zoning in California Law, 31 HAsTINGs L.J. 103, 118-20 (1979) (summarizing

California Court of Appeal decisions after Eldridge).
55. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
56. Id. at 277-78, 598 P.2d at 31-32, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 378-79.
57. Id. at 272-77, 598 P.2d at 27-31, 157 Cal. Rptr. 374-78.
58. Id. at 273, 598 P.2d at 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 375. The Court also recognized that Justice
Holmes' language in Pennsylvania Coal, taken in context, provided no support for a constitu-

tional requirement of compensation for enactment of an invalid ordinance. Id. at 274, 498 P.2d
at 29, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 376. Moreover, the court stressed the undesirable policy implications,
particularly "a chilling effect upon the exercise of police regulatory powers at a local level,"
of a rule requiring compensation. Id. at 276, 598 P.2d at 30, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 377. The court,
citing Hall, supra note 54, at 1597, concluded that it would be unwise to entrust to the judiciary
such control over the municipal budget, thus undermining legislative control of the land use
process. 24 Cal. 3d at 276, 598 P.2d at 30, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 377. The Agins decision did not
overturn established California precedent in the airplane overflight and precondemnation activity areas. In fact, Klopping v. City of Whittier, 8 Cal. 3d 39, 500 P.2d 1345, 104 Cal. Rptr.
1 (1972), a leading precondemnation activity case was cited and distinguished in the Agins opinion. 24 Cal. 3d at 278, 598 P.2d at 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
59. 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976).
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held that compensation was not available as a remedy."0 The court reasoned
that
a purported "regulation" may impose so onerous a burden on the property regulated that it has, in effect, deprived the owner of the reasonable
income productive or other private use of his property and thus has
destroyed its economic value. In all but exceptional cases, nevertheless,
such a regulation does not constitute a "taking" and is therefore not compensable, but amounts to a deprivation or frustration 6 of property rights
without due process of law and is therefore invalid .
Although the courts in California and New York have discussed the issue
most extensively, the availability of compensation as a remedy for unconstitutional land use ordinances had not, prior to San Diego Gas, entirely escaped
the attention of other courts. Scattered state courts generally concluded that
damages were not available,6 as did the most significant of a few federal
courts.'3 And in the few decided cases since San Diego Gas, the courts have
been divided on the impact of the decision."4
60. Id. at 593-94, 350 N.E.2d at 384-85, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 8.
61. Id. at 593-94, 350 N.E.2d at 385, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 8. While adhering to a general rule
that only an exercise of the eminent domain power subjects government to a claim for just compensation, the New York courts have recognized exceptions. The most noteworthy of these is
illustrated in the sequence of Keystone Assocs. cases, decided before Fred F. French Investing
Co., involving the old Metropolitan Opera House. See infra text accompanying notes 181-84.
62. See Davis v. Pima County, 121 Ariz. 343, 590 P.2d 459 (1978); Gold Run, Ltd. v. Board
of County Comm'rs, 38 Colo. App. 44, 554 P.2d 317 (1976); DeMello v. Town of Plainville,
170 Conn. 695, 368 A.2d 71 (1976); Mailman Dev. Co. v. City of Hollywood, 286 So. 2d 614
(Fla. App. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974); Pratt v. State, 309 N.W.2d 767 (Minn.
1981); McShane v. City of Faribault, 292 N.W.2d 253 (Minn. 1980); Ech v. City of Bismark,
283 N.W.2d 193 (N.D. 1979) (citing California, New York and Minnesota cases); Fifth Avenue
Corp. v. Washington County, 282 Or. 591, 581 P.2d 50 (1978) (quoting from Fred F. French
Investing Co.); Brabham v. City of Sumter, 272 S.C. 597, 274 S.E.2d 297 (1981). But cf. Ventures in Property v. City of Wichita, 225 Kan. 698, 594 P.2d 671 (1979) (declining to preclude
damage awards against municipalities); Mattoon v. City of Norman, 617 P.2d 1347 (Okla. 1980);
City of Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. 1978).
63. Although federal courts, especially in the Ninth Circuit, appeared to be more receptive
to damage actions than were state courts, most merely sustained complaints against dismissal
or summary judgment motions. See, e.g., Barbaccia v. County of Santa Clara, 451 F. Supp.
260 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Sanfilippo v. County of Santa Cruz, 415 F. Supp. 1340 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
Even in those cases, the court indicated that injured plaintiffs would bear a "heavy burden of
proving entitlement to monetary relief." Id. at 1343. And the First Circuit expressed even greater
hostility to a damage remedy:
Federal enforcement of the inverse condemnation remedy would be a singularly
inappropriate intrusion into the states' traditional domains of property law and
land use policy. The federal constitutional right can be secured to the individual
without forcing the state to purchase his property. Voiding the offending restriction will make the owner whole ....

Moreover, once the constitutional line has

been drawn, the state or local authority administering the complex structure of
land use controls should be free to decide whether the expected benefits from the
restriction are worth the cost of the required compensation.
Pamel Corp. v. Puerto Rico Highway Auth., 621 F.2d 33, 36 (1st Cir. 1980) (citation omitted).
64. Courts have, however, been more inclined to award damages as a remedy than they were
before San Diego Gas. Compare Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1981);
Burrows v. City of Keene, 432 A.2d 15 (N.H. 1981); Sheerr v. Township of Evesham, 184 N.J.
Super. 11,445 A.2d 46 (1982); Rippley v. City of Lincoln, 330 N.W.2d 505 (N.D. 1983); Annicelli
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C. Summary
That government is limited in its right to interfere by regulation with land
use is established, if not by "express constitutional guarantee," then at least
by the Supreme Court's well-entrenched exegesis of the constitutional text.
But the Court's exegesis has never been explicit about the constitutional source
of the limitation, and the constitutional text does not state that a government
entity shall be liable in money damages if it enacts invalid regulations. Nor
has the Supreme Court ever held that any particular remedy must be made
available to aggrieved landowners.
Limitations on the right of government to regulate land use can plausibly
be located in either of two constitutional provisions-the just compensation
clause or the due process clause. However, if violations of the just compensation clause always require a court to award aggrieved landowners money
damages without consideration of the policy implications, then there is little
reason to classify overly restrictive regulations as violations of the just compensation clause when another plausible constitutional source, the due process clause, permits courts to perform a policy evaluation of alternative
remedies. In other words, it is curious to require policy to be dictated by
doctrine when doctrine could so easily be shaped to accommodate policy.
Of course, locating the source of the constitutional protections in the due
process clause would not resolve the questions of remedy; it would merely
permit policy inquiry to begin. Many constitutional rights can be vindicated
in more than one way. Some of the potentially available remedies may be
more advantageous to the victims of unconstitutional behavior than others
would be. The Supreme Court, however, has not always made available, and
need not make available, the remedy most favorable to injured parties or the
remedy most likely to avoid constitutional violations. When the issue is application to the states of one of the amendments which comprise the Bill of
Rights, the Court need only assure that a state provides a remedy that implements adequately the constitutional command.65 Whether any particular
remedy is adequate, especially if another remedy would provide the injured
party with more complete vindication, is a question that necessarily involves
consideration of the social and institutional implications of the alternative
remedies. That consideration the Supreme Court has not yet undertaken.

II.

GOVERNMENT LIABILITY FOR UNCONSTITUTIONAL ACTION: THE
GENERAL PROBLEM

The "takings" cases provide only one perspective on the issue of municipal
liability in damages for unconstitutional land use ordinances. The problem
v. Town of South Kingstown, 463 A.2d 133 (R.I. 1983) (all acknowledging availability of compensation) with Citadel Corp. v. Puerto Rico Highway Auth., 695 F.2d 31 (1st Cir. 1982) (damages
not available); Wyoming Borough v. Wyco Realty Co., 64 Pa. Commw. 459, 440 A.2d 696 (1982).
65. See generally Hill, The Bill of Rights and The Supervisory Power, 69 COLUM. L. REv.
181, 182-92 (1969); Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1109, 1112-22 (1969).
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can also be viewed in a broader context. Government at all levels can, through
its officials, act unconstitutionally in a variety of ways. Police officers can
conduct unreasonable, warrantless searches of homes or automobiles. State
legislatures or Congress can enact statutes purporting to forbid abortion. Courts
can convict defendants based in part on involuntary confessions. Agreement
that all of these actions are prohibited by the Constitution does not resolve,
or even address, the question of remedy for citizens who feel aggrieved. Traditionally, victims of such unconstitutional government action have not been
entitled, as a constitutional right, to damages." Recent court opinions6 7 and
scholarly work,"1 however, suggest consideration, although not adoption, of
a damage remedy whenever a governmental body or government official acts
unconstitutionally.
Several doctrinal obstacles have, until recently, precluded extensive judicial
consideration of the appropriate scope of government liability for unconstitutional action. Primary among them have been the immunity doctrines that
protect governmental entities from suit. In particular, the longstanding
sovereign immunity doctrine has insulated the United States from liability for
its unconstitutional actions. 69 Similarly, the states are protected by the eleventh
amendment from suit in federal court70 and by state sovereign immunity doc7
trines in their own courts. '

The immunity doctrines, however, have not been the only doctrinal bars
to judicial evaluation of a damage remedy. Until Bivens v. Six Unknown
FederalNarcoticsAgents was decided in 1971, the Supreme Court had been
unwilling, in the absence of statutory authority, to imply directly from the
Constitution a cause of action for damages. The Bivens case involved only

66. The doctrinal obstacles to recovery of damages against government entities are discussed
in the text infra accompanying notes 69-75.
67. See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980); Monell v. Department
of Social Servs., 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
68. See, e.g., Schnapper, Civil Rights Litigation After Monell, 79 COLum. L. Ray. 213 (1979);
Schuck, Suing Our Servants: The Courts, Congress, and The Liability of Public Officials for
Damages, 1980 Sup. CT. REv. 281.
69. For a lucid discussion of the historical bases for the sovereign immunity doctrine, see
Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1 (1924) (the discussion at 28-41 is especially
helpful).
70. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI.
For an extensive treatment of the eleventh amendment restrictions, see Field, The Eleventh
Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines,Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 515 (1977);
Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: CongressionalImposition of Suit Upon the States, 126 U. PA. L. Rav. 1203 (1978).
Professor Field begins her study by stating: "The one interpretation of the eleventh amendment to which everyone subscribes is that it was intended to overturn Chisholm v. Georgia."
126 U. PA. L. Rav. at 515. The Chisholm case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), had held the State
of Georgia subject to suit by citizens of South Carolina in the United States Supreme Court.
71. For a survey of the status of state sovereign immunity, see RESTATEMENT (SEcorD) oT
ToRTs § 895A (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973).
72. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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liability of federal officials for a violation of the fourth amendment, not liability of the federal government itself. The prior reluctance to imply a cause of
action against federal officials, however, would undoubtedly have extended
to claims against the government itself had not sovereign immunity independently provided the government with sufficient protection. Nor did section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act" provide a basis for awards of money
damages against state or local governments. The statute did furnish authority
to hold state officials liable for violations of federal constitutional rights, but
under the doctrine of Monroe v. Pape," municipalities were not considered
"persons" covered by the Act. Only when the Court in Monell v. Department of Social Services"' overruled Monroe, holding that municipalities were
"persons" for the purposes of section 1983,76 did the Civil Rights Act furnish a basis for municipal damage liability.
As a result of continued sovereign immunity protection, federal and state
government liability has not been directly affected by the expanded scope of
section 1983 and the increased willingness to imply a cause of action directly
from the Constitution. Section 1983 and the Bivens doctrine have expanded
government liability only to the extent that the government entity has agreed
to indemnify its officers for liability they incur. Local governments, because
they have never enjoyed sovereign immunity, have been affected more directly. In particular, two recent Supreme Court decisions, Monell and Owen v.
City of Independence," have stripped municipalities of immunity from suit
under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. The Supreme Court's new interpretation of that statute has provided impetus for considering the scope of
government liability for various forms of unconstitutional government action,
including enactment of unconstitutional land use ordinances.
In Owen, the Chief of Police brought suit against the city, the City Manager,
and the members of the city council, alleging that he was discharged without
a hearing and without notice of reasons.7 8 He sought back pay in addition
to declaratory and injunctive relief. In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme
Court held that the good faith of the muncipality's officers and agents was
not a defense to the municipality's own liability under section 1983. 79 In sweeping language relying upon principles of compensation, deterrence, and equitable
loss-spreading, the Court concluded that municipal liability provided the proper allocation of costs among the principals in section 1983 suits." In doing
so, it declared that "municipalities have no immunity from damages liability
flowing from their constitutional violations .... -8,
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
365 U.S. 167 (1961).
436 U.S. 658 (1978).
Id. at 663.
445 U.S. 622 (1980).
Id. at 630.
Id. at 638.
Id. at 650-58.
Id. at 657.
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Despite the broad language in Owen, it is unlikely that the Court would
find a municipality liable in damages whenever any municipal officials, executing government policy or customs, 82 take actions that the Supreme Court
ultimately finds unconstitutional. Two examples are illustrative. First, suppose an elected municipal judge with power to try certain criminal cases admits highly probative evidence later declared to be unconstitutionally obtained,
resulting in defendant's conviction and imprisonment. If the broad language
in Owen is read literally, the municipality would be liable in damages to the
defendant for defendant's losses due to his imprisonment, even if defendant
were guilty of the crime charged.8 3 Second, suppose a local school board has
voted, after much deliberation, not to purchase a set of biology textbooks
solely because the books do not contain treatment of creationism as a plausible explanation of the development of man. If that decision is unconstitutional, a literal reading of the Owen opinion could provide a damage remedy
to the injured textbook publisher, to affected students or parents, or perhaps
to both.
These examples are raised here only to suggest that there are instances of
uncorstitutional municipal action not considered by the Court in Oweninstances in which the Court might not be disposed to find municipal liability. The Court in Owen established beyond question that a municipality's status
as a municipality does not furnish a defense to a claim for damages resulting
from unconstitutional action. But concluding that a municipality and a private
party are equally liable for unconstitutional activities does not end discussion, because there are some municipal activities that are not conducted by
private parties.84 Deciding litigated cases and enacting ordinancesare among
these activities. The problem is determining whether and in what circumstances
performance of those inherently governmental activities in an unconstitutional
manner creates a claim on which damage relief should be granted. That determination involves an evaluation of the impact of damage relief on both injured parties and the institutions of government, an evaluation pursued by
the Court in Owen, 8' but not with sufficient generality to justify an expansive
reading of the Court's opinion.
Courts have long recognized that the impact of liability on governmental
processes is an important consideration in fashioning rights and remedies
against government entities. For one example, the so-called discretionary function exception to municipal tort liability reflects judicial and legislative concem about the institutional effects of a constant threat of liability whenever
a government body makes a decision. 6 As another illustration, the Supreme
82. Id. at 633.
83. Of course, this assumes that the "edicts or acts" of a judge may fairly be said to represent official policy. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
84. See Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HA v. L. Rv.
209, 215-18 (1963).
85. 445 U.S. at 650-56.

86. For a thoughtful recent judicial discussion of this concern, see Whitney v. City of Worcester,
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Court has emphasized the potentially paralytic effect of government officer
liability in fashioning absolute or qualified immunity doctrines for various
government officials. 7 The institutional dangers do not disappear when the
issue is government, rather than officer, liability for unconstitutional action.
However expansive the language of the majority opinion, the Owen decision
did not resolve the issue in favor of liability for all cases of unconstitutional
government action.
Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union,"8 decided less than two
months after Owen, supports the conclusion that not all unconstitutional
government activity gives rise to liability. The issue in that case was the section 1983 liability of the Virginia Supreme Court for promulgating, and not
amending, a bar code that strictly prohibited attorney advertising in violation
of the first amendment. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief and
attorneys fees. The United States Supreme Court held unanimously that the
Virginia court was entitled to legislative immunity for its activities in connection with the bar code. 9
The issue in Consumers Union, as in Owen, was liability for unconstitutional activity. Also as in Owen, both an individual defendant, here the chief
justice, and a government entity, here the Virginia Supreme Court, were named
as defendants. Yet despite the sharp distinction the Court drew in Owen between immunity for individual defendants and immunity for government entities, the opinion in Consumers Union never separated the court's immunity
from that of the chief justice. In fact, at one point, the Court asserted that
[t]here is little doubt that if the Virginia Legislature had enacted the State
Bar Code and if suit had been brought against the legislature, its committees, or members for refusing to amend the Code . . . the defendants

in that suit could successfully have sought dismissal on the grounds of
absolute legislative immunity.90

373 Mass. 208, 366 N.E.2d 1210 (1977). In Whitney, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
indicated its intention to abrogate governmental immunity if the state legislature did not promptly do so by statute. The court, however, suggested that government entities should continue to
remain immune "[w]hen the particular conduct which caused the injury is one characterized
by [a] high degree of discretion and judgment." Id. at 218, 366 N.E.2d at 1216.
The questions the court deemed relevant in deciding whether government should be immune were:
Was the injury-producing conduct an integral part of governmental policymaking
or planning? Might the imposition of tort liability jeopardize the quality and efficiency of the governmental process? Could a judge or jury review the conduct in
question without usurping the power and responsibility of the legislative or executive branches? Is there an alternate remedy available to the injured individual
other than an action for damages?
Id. at 219, 366 N.E.2d at 1217.
87. See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240-49 (1974); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.
547, 554 (1967).
88. 446 U.S. 719 (1980).
89. Id. at 734. The Court also held that the Virginia Supreme Court, when acting in its capacity
as enforcer of the state bar code, would be subject to suit for declaratory and injunctive relief
under § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. Id. at 736-37.
90. Id. at 733-34.
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By failing to distinguish among "the legislature, its committees, or members"

for purposes of applying the immunity doctrine, the Court indicated that,
at least for this type of unconstitutional government action, no liability attaches whether the defendant is an individual officer or a government entity. 9'

Moreover, the Court in Consumers Union used "legislative immunity" as
a justification for insulating the Virginia Supreme Court from liability. The
legislative immunity doctrine was developed to protect individual officers from
liability that it was feared would impair the functioning of government

processes. 92 The Court's choice of the legislative immunity label reveals an
awareness that concerns parallel to those that led to protection of govern-

ment officers also contribute to a need to insulate government from some
93
forms of liability.
Even after Owen, then, the Court remains willing to immunize government
entities from liability for some forms of unconstitutional activity. One cannot, of course, divine from the Consumers Union opinion whether a
municipality would be accorded the same protection as the Virginia Supreme

Court, and whether municipal land use regulations would be treated in the
same manner as a state bar code. But Consumers Union at least indicates

that the Owen opinion did not foreclose consideration of the broad questionwhen should a municipality
or other government entity be liable for its un4
constitutional action?'
III.

DAMAGE REMEDY FOR UNCONSTITUTIONAL LAND USE

ORDINANCES: COMPENSATION AND LOSS-SPREADING IMPLICATIONS

The preceding sections suggest that existing "takings" cases, precedent
developing under the Bivens doctrine,9" and section 198396 neither establish
91. But cf. Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391,
405 n.29 (distinguishing between immunity of individual members of a bistate agency and immunity of the agency itself).
92. 446 U.S. at 731.
93. The Court, in a footnote, also posited another possible ground for denying plaintiffs
relief: "Of course, legislators sued for enacting a state bar code might also succeed in obtaining
dismissals at the outset on grounds other than legislative immunity, such as the lack of a case
or controversy." Id. at 734 n.12. The Court cited no authority for this proposition, but the
point is undoubtedly related to what Professor Jerry Mashaw, in a slightly different context,
has called the "cause-of-action argument." Mashaw, Civil Liability of Government Officers:
Property Rights and Official Accountability, 42 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 8, 29-33 (1978).
In discussing liability of government officers for negligent performance of their duties, Mashaw
says: "Plaintiffs would, indeed should, still be required to state a cause of action having the
usual elements: act, cause, damage, fault. And many official functions, when negligently performed, produce harms that seem to fit poorly within these general contours." Id. at 29. Some
of the same "fit" problems exist when the issue is government liability for unconstitutional action.
94. Cf. K.C. DAvis, ADn nSrRAArv LAW TRE -nsE, 1982 Supplement, § 25:00-4: "The Court's
conclusion that 'municipalities have no immunity from damages liability flowing from their constitutional violations,' is likely to be restricted as applied to a city's legislative enactments and
to a city's formal adjudication." Id. at 401 (citations omitted).
95. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
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nor prevent the availability of a damage remedy against municipalities for
enactment of an unconstitutional land use ordinance. There are, however,
two forceful policy arguments for affording a damage remedy to victims of
unconstitutional land use regulation. First, fairness to victims of land use
regulation dictates that they be compensated for all of their losses. Second,
the spectre of damage awards will increase efficiency in decisionmaking by
forcing municipal decisionmakers to weigh the full social cost of potential
ordinances against the expected benefits of the ordinances. This section analyzes
the fairness argument, and the following section discusses the efficiency
concerns.
A.

Compensationfor Harm: The Role of Fault Principles

In Owen v. City of Independence, 7 the city had, by denying Owen notice
of reasons and a hearing, dismissed him in violation of his due process rights,
causing a loss. The Supreme Court, citing the municipality's unconstitutional
action, justified its holding of municipal liability in part by noting that
"[e]lemental notions of fairness dictate that one who causes a loss should
bear the loss." 9 Presumably, it was not merely causation of the loss, but
causation of the loss by breach of the municipality's duty to act constitutionally, that led the Court to conclude that the municipality should compensate Owen.
To the extent that the Constitution embodies a set of moral commands
to government bodies, violation of which entitles those harmed to compensation because they "deserve" to be free of the impermissible government intrusion or to be compensated for losses caused by the intrusion, the "government fault" analysis in Owen is unassailable; indeed, it is self-evident. If the
constitutional protections against restrictive land use ordinances reflected a
notion that landowners merited absolute protection from losses due to government interference with property rights, then landowners aggrieved by ordinances that transgress constitutional limits would have a fault-based claim
for damages. But neither the due process clause nor the just compensation
clause is so absolute; the Court has tolerated substantial government interference with property rights, recognizing appropriately that the value and
even the existence of property rights depends heavily on governmental action.'
Most zoning ordinances diminish the value of at least some land within
the community. If that diminution in value were itself wrongful, presumably
all harmed landowners would be entitled to redress. The justification for zoning, however, lies in the judgment that a zoning scheme will benefit landowners
and the general public more than it will harm adversely affected landowners.''
97. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
98. Id. at 654.
99. Cf. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 331-33, 366 N.E.2d
1271, 1275-76, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914, 918-19 (1977), aff'd, 438 U.S. 104, reh'g denied, 439 U.S.
883 (1978).
100. For an insightful but brief summary of the purposes of collective action written in the
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But even on that premise, the public could compensate affected landowners
for their losses and still receive some benefits from the enactment. Yet the
Constitution does not require such compensation.
The primary problem with a system that would require compensation for
all losses is that the cost of computing compensation and dispensing it would
likely destroy the "average reciprocity of advantage" ' of the ordinance. Appraisals, negotiation, and litigation would be necessary each time a landowner
felt mildly aggrieved by an ordinance, even if he had present plans for developing or selling his land. Moreover, the basis for valuation would be far from
clear. Even landowners who, on balance, suffer from imposition of a land
use ordinance generally receive some benefit-from the imposition of a scheme
on other landowners.I 2 Evaluating that benefit in computing a compensation
award would be a formidable task. Finally, if fairness would require elimination of all losses from zoning enactments, it would probably also require
disgorgement of unequal benefits enjoyed by some landowners.1 0 3 That process, too, would involve costly computations. Thus, zoning, and derivatively
other land use planning, rests on the premise that it is not wrong to diminish
the value of some land, even to a very great degree, if the diminution is part
of a scheme that, on balance, benefits the public.
On what basis, then, are ordinances declared unconstitutional for "the severity of the impact of the law"' 0 4 on a particular parcel? A landowner knowing
that a land use scheme would cause losses, but not knowing on whom they
would fall, might in some circumstances choose to risk enduring a variety
of losses uncompensated. In particular, he might choose to bear that risk if
he recognizes that compensating people in his general position would, over
time, cause the community to forgo benefits that he and others in his position would choose to have the community enjoy."0 5 But some ordinances might
impose restrictions that, frequently due to the size of the individual loss, landowners would not risk enduring as part of a scheme to further the greater
context of the takings problem, see Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on
the Ethical Foundationsof "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv.1165, 1172-83 (1967).
101. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), quoted in Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 140 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d at 331-32, 366 N.E.2d at 1275, 397 N.Y.S.2d
at 917, aff'd, 438 U.S. 104, reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978):
Zoning restrictions operate to advance a comprehensive community plan for the
common good. Each property owner in the zone is both benefited and restricted
from exploitation, presumably without discrimination, except for permitted continuing nonconforming uses. The restrictions may be designed to maintain the general
character of the area, or to assure orderly development, objectives inuring to the
benefit of all, which property owners acting individually would find difficult or
impossible to achieve ....
102. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324 at 329, 366 N.E.2d
at 1274, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 917 (1977), aff'd, 438 U.S. 104, reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978),
where the Court discussed the numerous social contributions to land value.
103. For such a proposal, see D. HAGMAN & D. MISCZYNSKI, WINDFALLS FOR WnEotrrs: LAND
VALUE CAPTURE AND COMPENSATION (1978). See also Hagman, CompensableRegulation:A Way
of Dealing with Wipeouts From Land Use Controls, 54 U. DET. J. URB. L. 45, 98-99 (1976).
104. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978).
105. See Michelman, supra note 100, at 1223.
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good. It is these ordinances that should not, and do not generally, survive
constitutional scrutiny.
On this view, the just compensation requirement is a loss-spreading device,
designed to assure that no individuals are singled out to bear unusually heavy
burdens. And if the constitutional demarcation is itself a loss-spreading device,
the damage remedy should also be evaluated, in the context of the constitutional design, for its loss-spreading implications and for its potential effects
on governmental policy.
B.

The Damage Remedy as a Loss-Spreading Mechanism

The majority in Owen recognized that "[n]o longer is individual 'blameworthiness' the acid test of [tort] liability; the principle of equitable lossspreading has joined fault as a factor in distributing the costs of official
misconduct.""'0 By imposing municipal liability in Owen, the Supreme Court
assured that the harm caused by the constitutional violation involved would
not be borne by Owen alone, but instead, would be spread among the taxpayers. By analogy, support for a damage remedy for unconstitutional land
use measures rests on the premise that the resulting losses could better be
borne by the taxpaying public rather than by the individuals affected by the
ordinance.
Of course, a landowner who persuades a court to declare a land use ordinance unconstitutional as applied to his property has managed to avoid some,
perhaps most, of the loss he would suffer from application of the ordinance.
The question is whether the frequently significant interim damages suffered
as a result of delay in securing the declaration of invalidity ought to be borne
by himself alone or spread among his neighbors.
Whether the costs of delay in determining that an ordinance is unconstitutional should be spread is only one aspect of the larger questions: when and
why should any losses caused by enactment of a land use regulation be borne
by a single individual rather than spread among those who benefit from the
regulatory scheme? The primary justification for land use regulation without
compensation is the fear that if compensation was mandated, the costs of
administering a compensation system would cause government to'forgo regulatory measures that would produce a significant net increase in the aggregate
social welfare. In Professor Michelman's terms,
[a] decision not to compensate is not unfair as long as the disappointed
claimant ought to be able to appreciate how such decisions might fit into
a consistent practice which holds forth a lesser long-run risk to people
like him than would any consistent
practice which is naturally suggested
'7
by the opposite decision.

106. 445 U.S. 622, at 657 (1980).
107. Michelman, supra note 100, at 1223.
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Sometimes, however, a particular decision not to compensate would be difficult to fit into a consistent practice which does not include a significant longrun risk that some landowners will sustain concentrated losses. If that risk
is great enough, the prospect of increased aggregate social welfare is unlikely
to make potential victims of concentrated loss willing to bear the risk of loss.
In that circumstance, if a project that imposes losses is to be undertaken,
it should only be undertaken upon payment of compensation.
When the issue is the availability of interim damages, the risk of loss is
limited to the costs imposed by delay in obtaining an adjudication of unconstitutionality. Suppose, however, that findings of unconstitutionality are
reserved only for those ordinances so egregious that landowners cannot fathom
how enacting them would, even in the long run, benefit similarly situated
people. An affected landowner might not be convinced that invalidating these
ordinances without awarding interim damages would "hold forth a lesser longrun risk to people like him" than would a rule of compensation for interim
damages. But it is also likely that the demoralization costs incurred when an
unconstitutional ordinance is enacted can be reduced markedly by an adjudication that the ordinance is invalid, even if the judgment is not accompanied
by an award of interim damages.
In particular, if the cause of the loss is merely the delay attendant to adjudication, landowners may not regard their loss as unduly concentrated. First,
some delay in obtaining the approval necessary for any development to proceed is unavoidable. The delay may be slight if the developer need wait only
for issuance of a building permit or certificate of occupancy for a suburban
house; it can often be measured in years if the developer needs approval from
a large bureaucracy before embarking on an extensive or innovative urban
project. Either way, however, so long as a developer can constitutionally be
required to obtain the approvals, the developer is obliged to suffer at least
reasonable delays while his application receives the necessary consideration.
When the delay involved is in obtaining an adjudication that a particular
restriction is unconstitutional, it is a delay in seeking judicial redress from
administration denials rather than a delay that can be categorized as "administrative." But that difference, by itself, would be of little practical importance to landowners or potential developers. If, out of fear of potential
liability, those responsible for regulating land use took greater time and care
in evaluating constitutional issues, the delay in obtaining judicial redress might
be shifted to a delay, presumably noncompensable, in obtaining administrative
approvals. The practical problem in either case would be that development
could not proceed until the government bureaucracy has given its approval.
If delay in obtaining official approvals is a problem commonly faced by
landowners, as well as by the population at large, then losses due to delay
are not concentrated upon those landowners subject to unconstitutional ordinances. Except when the delays involved in obtaining an adjudication of
unconstitutionality are perceived as different in nature from other delays commonly incurred in obtaining government approvals, the "demoralization cost,"
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to use Michelman's term,"0 8 of not compensating landowners for the delay
are likely to be low.
But government delay in land use matters is not always the product of the
inevitably time-consuming process of evaluating a landowner's claim against
relevant constitutional and statutory provisions. Sometimes delay is the result
of deliberate obstructionism. Thus, an ordinance may be enacted, a permit
denied, or a litigation started not because municipal officials believe there
is any chance that the landowner can constitutionally be prevented from
developing, but merely because the municipality wants to erect as many
obstacles as is possible to discourage or at least postpone the inevitable. Delay
that results from such obstructionism may create demoralization costs not
associated with "ordinary" delays. Losses suffered as a result of obstructionist delays present a more compelling case for compensation because they
are not regarded as prevalent and unavoidable incidents of securing government approvals. The case would not be compelling merely because an ordinance is ultimately declared unconstitutional; it would be compelling only if
the landowner could demonstrate that the delay was motivated not by the
government's desire for judicial resolution of the constitutional questions, but
by factors normally regarded as outside the legitimate bounds of the government decisionmaking process.
If the fairness of a compensation decision is judged by comparing the
demoralization costs of not compensating with the settlement costs' 0 9 attendant to awarding compensation,"1 cases of municipal "bad faith," more than
other cases involving unconstitutional ordinances, are strong cases for interim
damage awards. Because the victim of municipal bad faith sustains, in
Michelman's words, "an injury distinct from those sustained by the generality of persons in society,""I' he may have a sense of exploitation not shared
by a landowner who, like numerous others throughout society, has had vindication of his rights delayed by government bureaucracy. And while high
demoralization costs are peculiar to victims of municipal bad faith, the settlement costs of providing compensation are at least as great when the municipality seeks an adjudication of constitutionality to relieve uncertainty rather than
to foster delay.

108. Michelman defines "demoralization costs" as "the total of (1) the dollar value necessary
to offset disutilities which accrue to losers and their sympathies specifically from the realization
that no compensation is offered, and (2) the present capitalized dollar value of lost future production (reflecting either iipaired incentives or social unrest) caused by the demoralization of
uncompensated losers, their sympathizers, and other observers disturbed by the thought that
they themselves may be subjected to similar treatment on some other occasion." Id. at 1214.
109. Again following Michelman, settlement costs are "the dollar value of the time, effort,
and resources which would be required in order to reach compensation settlements adequate
to avoid demoralization costs." Id.
110. Michelman suggests that a utilitarian calculus on the compensation question would require compensation if and only if demoralization costs exceed settlement costs. Id. at 1215.
Michelman's own fairness principle suggests a similar comparison. See id. at 1223.
111. Id.at 1217.
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If compensation is provided, the taxpayers generally must incur the cost
of computing damages. If compensation is limited to delays pending adjudica-

tion of the constitutionality of land use restrictions, the effect may not be
great, although computation costs may deter a few government programs with
net social benefit."' On the other hand, delay pending constitutional adjudication is just one of many delays endured as a result of government operation.
If compensation were required for all these delays, the computation costs involved would be considerable. And because the range of delays due to government operations is more diverse than if land use alone is considered, the chance
is smaller that any one individual would suffer disproportionately from a failure
to compensate for all government operation delays. Hence, there is less reason
to incur the costs of computation.
112. In addition to mechanical problems, damage computation raises conceptual difficulties
in determining what damages to attribute to enactment of unconstitutional ordinances. The initia difficulty is fixing a date from which interim damages should accrue. Calculating damages
from the date of the land use ordinance's enactment would be unfair to the municipality for
two reasons. First, unless the landowner was ready to develop or sell at the time the ordinance
was enacted, the ordinance, so long as it would ultimately be declared invalid, did him no harm.
Second, measuring damages from the date of enactment might encourage landowners to delay
bringing suit to allow damages to accumulate.
If interim damages are to be assessed, they ought to accrue from the time the landowner would
have developed in the absence of the ordinance. It is at that point that the ordinance first harmed
the landowner. But that point cannot be readily identified. Using the date at which a permit
or other authorization to develop is sought would also overstate the damages if that were an
established rule known to landowners. Every landowner affected by an ordinance of questionable
constitutionality could immediately seek a permit to assure the accrual of damages from an early
point. Especially because the permit will not be granted, the application is risk-free for the landowner, and it will be difficult for the municipality to establish that a permit applicant had no
present intention to develop. On the other hand, a rule that measures interim damages without
reference to a particular beginning event, like enactment of the ordinance or denial of a permit,
will plunge the court into an investigation of the landowner's state of mind about development
of his land.
The date of initial accrual, however, is not the only difficulty in assessing damages. Suppose,
to borrow an example from Professor Robert Ellickson, that a landowner can obtain a 10%
return on the value of his land and that his land is worth $500,000 unencumbered. Suppose
too, that subject to the ordinance, the land is worth $300,000. If the landowner challenges the
ordinance successfully, and does not develop the land in the interim, he loses $50,000 for each
year of delay. The municipality could argue, however, that even subject to the restriction, the
landowner could have received $30,000 annually, so that damages should be limited to $20,000.
Professor Ellickson suggests that damages should be limited to that amount in order to encourage
mitigation. See Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86

L.J. 385, 496-98 (1977). But if the landowner actually had mitigated by developing in compliance with the ordinance, that development is not likely to be reversible after the ordinance
is invalidated. The annual loss of $20,000 is not an interim amount for the period of delay,
but a permanent damage figure that will not cease when the ordinance is invalidated. Professor
Ellickson suggests the municipality ought to be liable for permanent damages in that circumstance.
This suggested mitigation rule is one many municipalities could do without. No solution to the
problem, however, is without significant disadvantages.
That damages are difficult to compute is not, of course, an excuse for denying relief. From
a policy perspective though, the speculative nature of damages casts doubt on the wisdom of
engaging in the process of awarding interim damages. Cf. Jaffe, supra note 84, at 225-26 (noting
that "some injuries have cried out more for remedy than others" and stressing that modes of
protection other than money damages are often appropriate for injuries arising from misuse
of government power).
YALE
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In addition, compensating for interim damages creates an unmeasurable
risk that government policymakers will acquire an increased and unwarranted
timidity, to the ultimate detriment of all landowners and taxpayers. The effect of compensating for interim damages on the decisionmaking process will
be explored in greater detail below;" 3 for present purposes it is enough to
suggest that a decisionmaking process skewed toward inaction is a risk of
compensating for interim damages. '4
To summarize, the decisionmaking processes of government inevitably cause
delay. So long as that delay is generally accepted and tolerated as a cost of
government, and so long as the effects of government delay generally are endured by a broad cross-section of society, the loss-spreading justification for
compensating those injured by government delay is not a strong one. The
omnipresence of government and its delays will assure some spreading of losses;
reflective citizens will choose to bear the risk of incurring the remaining
unspread losses if the costs of spreading those losses are sufficiently great.
That is not to suggest that loss-spreading principles never support damage
awards when the government acts unconstitutionally. Frequently, unconstitutional losses are concentrated on one or a few individuals with little likelihood
that the remainder of the population would ever have to endure similar hardships. For instance, loss-spreading principles might support a damage remedy
for some forms of abusive police behavior because few individuals are ever
subject to police abuse or any comparable harm, and because a decision to
leave the victims uncompensated cannot easily be fit into a broader scheme
that would justify the failure to compensate." '
Similarly, when government delay is the result not of consideration and
resolution of difficult policy or legal issues, but of a municipality's attempt
to avoid its legal obligations, the resulting losses are more likely to be concentrated on few individuals rather than spread among the citizenry. Government is expected to take time to deliberate; government is not expected to
knowingly obstruct the vindication of settled legal rights. Because society expects, or at least hopes, that government obstructionism is not prevalent, lossspreading principles may impel compensation in those instances when obstructionism does cause losses even if losses caused by government delay are not
generally compensated. Thus, loss-spreading principles may suggest awarding
interim damages when a municipality enacts or seeks to enforce an unconstitutional ordinance "in bad faith"; unconstitutionality of the ordinance alone
does not justify an award of damages on loss-spreading principles.

113. See infra notes 116-78 and accompanying text.
114. See infra notes 122-27 and accompanying text.
115. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), for instance, could
be justified on this ground. A similar rationale might justify a damage award in Owen, 445 U.S. 622.

1984]
IV.

GOVERNMENT LIABILITY
THE IMPACT ON MuNICn'AL POLICY: TH:E EFFICIENCY CASE
FOR A DAMAGE REMEDY

Much of the law and economics literature focuses on means to internalize
external costs and benefits, that is, means to visit upon decisionmakers all
effects of their decisions."" When a municipality enacts an unconstitutional
ordinance, damage liability visits upon the municipality the consequences of
its decision. The Supreme Court, in Owen v. City of Independence,"' made
explicit its inclination to internalize the costs imposed by the decisions of
municipal decisionmakers: "[t]he knowledge that a municipality will be liable
for all of its injurious conduct, whether committed in good faith or not, should
create an incentive for officials who may harbor doubts about the lawfulness
of their intended actions to err on the side of protecting citizens' constitutional rights."" 8
Although municipal liability socializes the costs of municipal action, it internalizes those costs only to thp extent that municipal decisionmakers feel
the pangs of municipal liability. Only if municipal decisionmakers, in contemplating potential action, are affected by the prospect of municipal liability for their actions does a damage remedy internalize the costs of municipal
action. Unfortunately, the effects of municipal liability on individual decisionmakers raise unresolved empirical questions." 9 Officials contemplating
municipal action might, or might not, consider the potential damage liability
of taxpaying constituents regardless of the existence of a damage remedy.
Much depends on the relationships among the municipal entity, its constituents, and its decisionmakers.' 2 °
Even were one to assume that socializing the costs of government action
generally internalizes them, a more basic question would remain: is socialization of the costs of government action a sensible goal? Sometimes internalization of costs is inconsistent in principle with widely accepted activities of
116. See, e.g., G. CALJARarS, THE CosTs oF AcciDETIrs 68-95, 135-73 (1970); Demsetz, Toward
a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. EcoN. Rav. 347, 347-57 (1967).
117. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
118. Id. at 651-52.
119. See Baxter, EnterpriseLiability, Publicand Private,42 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 45 (1978),
suggesting that imposing liability on government enterprises for certain of its officials' actions
is less likely to cause the enterprise to account for the consequences of those actions than is
an enterprise liability role for private enterprises:
When one turns to the question of government-enterprise liability, one must
recognize that there is far less assurance that either intra-enterprise adaptation or
output reduction will occur: in many instances output price is zero; in others price
will bear no specific relationship to cost; incentives for cost minimization appear
to be weak; and empire-building may constitute the dominant institutional motivation.
Id. at 51.
120. See generally Nelson, Officeholding andPowerwielding:An Analysis of the Relationship
between Structure and Style in American Administrative History, 10 LAw & Soc. Ray. 187 (1976).
Nelson's historical study explores the relationship between the means of acquiring administrative
office and the process of making administrative decisions.
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government. For example, all intentionally redistributive policies are designed
to create external benefits and to impose external costs. Or when government
enacts rules that seem less consciously redistributive-rules forbidding theft
or pollution, for example-society would not want government to bear the
losses that such rules impose on thieves and polluters. The rules themselves
are designed in part to force potential thieves and polluters to internalize the
costs of their activities. To force government to bear the costs imposed by
its rulemaking activity would defeat the purpose of the government activity.
But if all the costs of government actions are not to be socialized, should
the costs of any particular government actions be socialized? For instance,
would government processes be improved if the losses imposed by unconstitutional government actions were socialized? Would they be improved if the
losses suffered as a result of unconstitutional land use enactments were
socialized? In addressing these questions, the next two sections will discuss
first, the impact on the policymaking process of a general rule that would
make government liable whenever policymakers make unconstitutional decisions, and second, the particular justifications that support municipal liability for unconstitutional land use ordinances even if a more general damage
remedy is not available.
A.

Municipal Liability as "an incentive for officials . . . to err on the
side of protecting citizens' constitutional rights" 2 '

Even if it would be wrong in principle and difficult in practice to internalize the costs of all actions taken by government decisionmakers, some costs
might warrant attempts at internalization. For instance, constitutional limitations may be considered sufficiently important that government decisionmakers
should not approach them without weighing the risk of potential municipal
liability. The Supreme Court's opinion in Owen appears to rest, in part, on
that premise."' Of course, because of the prohibitions on damage awards
against the states and the federal government,' 23 the principal focus of the
debate over government liability has been at the municipal level.
1. The Damage Remedy and Skewed Incentives for Municipal Inaction
A rule that subjects municipalities to liability in damages for all policy decisions that transcend constitutional limitations, but for no other decisions,
presents at least two problems. First, a blanket liability rule could provide
a general incentive for government inaction because no comparable damage
sanction would attach to a decision not to act. Second, a blanket liability

121. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 652 (1980).
122. Id.
123. See supra notes 66-94 and accompanying text.
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rule could engage municipal officials in a level of constitutional decisionmak-

ing that is either wasteful or counterproductive in the context of our system
of government.

Because constitutional standards are flexible and often ambiguous, the effect of municipal liability on official behavior, if there is any, will be to deter

enactment of some ordinances that the Supreme Court would hold constitutional as well as some it would hold unconstitutional. Presumably, the constitutional ordinances not enacted due to the deterrent effect of the threat
of damages are ordinances with some social value, at least according to the

branches of government that enacted them. Deterring unconstitutional activity, then, is not costless. 121
Moreover, to the extent that a damage remedy would produce an impact

on municipal decisionmaking, the impact would be to deter only municipal
policies that require action. Municipal policy may frequently be not to act

on a particular problem, and that form of municipal policy would remain
would serve
undisturbed by a damage remedy. As a result, the damage 2remedy
5
as a geneial judicial prod toward municipal inactivity.1
Without the threat of municipal liability, a municipal legislature would be

free to enact ordinances it believed desirable, and, if the ordinance were
challenged, to have a determination of constitutionality made by a court.
Because advisory opinions are not generally available, 26 challenge to the ordinance after its enactment would be the only available method for testing

its constitutionality. But if damages were imposed for unconstitutional enactments, the legislature would not be able to test the ordinance's constitutionality

without risking municipal liability. Since no similar risk would accompany
a decision not to enact an ordinance, the damage remedy would provide some

incentive for legislatures not to act.
As already noted, the risk of liability would force a majoritarian legislature
to internalize costs that would otherwise be shouldered by a small class of
constituents-costs the legislature might ignore if judicial review were the only

redress available to the aggrieved parties. As a result, municipal liability might

124. A simple but extreme example, not involving financial liability, is illustrative: the fourth
and fifth amendments to the Constitution restrict police activity. On the other hand, a municipality
has no federal constitutional obligation to maintain a police force. Since hiring a policeman
increases the risk of fourth and fifth amendment violations, a municipality seeking to minimize
the risk of constitutional violation would not hire a police force, nor would it order its officers
to conduct any searches because of the risk that some searches would be deemed unreasonable
and therefore unconstitutional. Although a municipality could order a more discriminating prohibition on certain types of searches, such a prohibition might nevertheless result in some unconstitutional searches that would be avoided by a blanket proscription of searches. Any rule
of law designed to deter unconstitutional police action and to ncourage police to "err on the
side of protecting citizens' constitutional rights" also serves to eter constitutional police action,
including apprehension of criminals.
125. Cf. Schuck, supra note 68, at 309-10; Mashaw, supranote 93, at 29-33 (discussing potential effects of asymmetry when government officer liability is at issue).
126. See, e.g., United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89 (1947).
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promote more efficient decisionmaking and reduce the risk of majority oppression of what may be a disfavored or nonvoting minority. 127
Majority oppression and inefficient decisionmaking, however, can result
as well from legislative inaction as from legislative action. Just as an
unrestrained majoritarian legislature might enact a program that provides
marginal benefit to many at substantial cost to few, a legislature could introduce the same potential inefficiency and oppression by declining to enact
a program that would provide substantial benefit to one group at trivial cost
to the remainder of the population. But if legislative inaction results in inefficiency when compared with enactment of a proposed ordinance, or if a
legislature declines to enact an ordinance that will protect or benefit a
vulnerable minority at the expense of majority wishes, money damages are
not available. The lack of parallel treatment for inefficiencies or oppression
caused by legislative action and those caused by inaction makes it difficult
to justify municipal liability for all unconstitutional actions as a judicial
assurance that the legislative process is working fairly and efficiently.
2.

The Institutional Consequences of Municipal Liability

To the extent that municipal officials are concerned about avoiding municipal
liability, the imposition of a damage remedy would require them to evaluate
more closely the constitutionality of their actions. One might ask, however,
whether evaluation of constitutional issues would require municipal officials
to expend disproportionate time and energy for what may be a small gain,
if that, in diminished constitutional infringement.
Even if officials did diligently attempt to conform their behavior to constitutional norms, the consequences for enforcement of constitutional rights
are not apparent. The problem is partly one of definition. No particular determination about the scope of a constitutional right is "correct" unless a particular determiner is endowed with the power to make a final, binding, and
therefore "correct" determination. If an official's own evaluation of constitutional questions is deemed final, then diligent official efforts to conform
to norms will, by definition, have eliminated entirely infringement of constitutional rights by government officials. But if the official's determination
is judged by reference to the standards of another decisionmaker deemed to
be authoritative (and it generally but not invariably is)' 28 then, again by definition, the official will commit errors that lead to infringement of constitutional rights. No official is likely to succeed where so many have failedpredicting with perfect accuracy the judgments which the "authoritative" decisionmaker would reach.
127. See generally J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JuDIciAL REVEw (1980)
(concluding that "judicial review . . . can appropriately concern itself only with questions of
participation, and not with the substantive merits of the political choice under attack"). Id. at 181.
128. Professor Lawrence Sager has argued that a decision by the Supreme Court not to enforce an asserted constitutional right should not always be regarded as a decision that the right
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To the extent that damages are awarded to deter unconstitutional behavior,
they are generally designed to deter behavior that the Supreme Court defines
as unconstitutional.' 2 9 And the municipal officials involved in the land use
regulation process, because of lack of training and the pressures of their position, are not likely to be adept at predicting the Supreme Court's course or
even at understanding and responding to a relatively clear course of Supreme
Court authority.
Of course, many government officials face constitutional questions without
legal training and without the judiciary's insulation from political pressures.
The problem is not peculiar to local legislators and enforcement officials. For
instance, Congress is frequently confronted with the constitutional implications of proposed legislation and the appropriate congressional response to
these constitutional questions has been a matter of dispute. President Franklin
Roosevelt, in urging passage of a piece of New Deal legislation of questionable
constitutionality, once suggested that the constitutionality question be left entirely to the courts:
But the situation is so urgent and the benefits of the legislation
so evident that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the bill,
leaving to the courts, in an orderly fashion, the ultimate question
of constitutionality ....
I hope your committee will not permit
doubts as to constitutionality, however reasonable, to block the

suggested legislation. 130

is not constitutionally protected and can be ignored by other government officials. Sager notes
that a decision not to enforce a right may rest on institutional, rather than analytical, considerations, and that the Supreme Court may decline enforcement precisely because it believes enforcement is better entrusted to other branches. Sager, FairMeasure: The Legal Status of Underenforced ConstitutionalNorms, 91 HARv. L. Ray. 1212, 1217-28 (1978). In these situtations, Sager
urges that officials should "regulate their behavior by standards more severe than those imposed
by the federal judiciary." Id. at 1227.
To the extent that the Supreme Court sustains damage claims for constitutional violations,
however, it implicitly concludes that there are no institutional barriers to judicial delineation
of the scope of the right involved. And if the Court's limitations on the scope of the right are
based on analytical considerations, not institutional ones, then the constitutional norms are not
"underenforced," and government officials should not be required to be more protective than
the Supreme Court.
In other words, if the right involved is "underenforced" for institutional reasons, then the
Supreme Court is likely to be institutionally disabled from formulating a damage remedy. If
the Court has the capacity to award a damage remedy, then the right is not underenforced,
and we need not encourage evaluation of rights by other officials in order to assure full implementation of the right involved. Moreover, the notion that damages must be made available
to vindicate constitutional rights is inconsistent with Sager's basic premise that not all legal obliga-)
tions need be vulnerable to external enforcement. Id. at 1221.
1
129. When the Supreme Court considers awarding damages to those injured by unconstitutional activity, constitutional determinations by other officials are considered only to the extent
that the Supreme Court has granted qualified privileges for "good faith" activities of those officials. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
130. Letter from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Congressman Samuel B. Hill (July 6,
1935), in IV FR nLN D. ROOSEVELT, PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES 297-98 (S. Rosenman ed.
1938). See D. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 6 (1966).
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More recent surveys suggest that many members of Congress do not believe
that Congress should form its own considered judgment on constitutional questions, but should instead leave those questions for the judiciary. 3' This at-

titude probably reflects two significant concerns. First, if Congress abstains
from enacting legislation based on constitutional reservations that the Supreme
Court does not share, Congress*will have forgone the opportunity to enact
legislation its members believed desirable.132 Second, on many issues, even

an earnest congressional effort to anticipate the Supreme Court's resolution
of constitutional questions is likely to fail. Many congressmen lack legal train-

ing. Moreover, the political environment in which members of Congress function minimizes the chance that congressional resolution of constitutional issues

will approximate that of the courts.' 3 Perhaps equally important, however,

is that Congress, in evaluating a bevy of social factors and making broad
policy judgments, cannot always predict the effect an enactment will have
in a particular case that subsequently arises.' 34
Of course, the notion that Congress should forgo consideration of the con-

stitutionality of legislation it enacts has engendered strong and reasoned
opposition.' 33 But that opposition is premised on the belief that Congress
should evaluate constitutional questions independently, not that Congress
should attempt slavishly to conform its own behavior to its predictions of

future Supreme Court actions. 36 Imposition of a damage sanction for failure
to act in accordance with Supreme Court standards would be inconsistent

with that premise, and indeed, advocates of congressional evaluation of constitutional issues have not suggested imposition of a sanction for enactment
of unconstitutional legislation.
This digression on the role of the Constitution in congressional delibera-

tion suggests some difficulties with conferring on municipal officials, and in
particular local legislatures, the responsibility for making constitutional deter-

minations. The institutional features that make congressional resolution of
131. D. MORGAN, supra note 130, at 8-10; see also Mikva & Lundy, The 91st Congress and
the Constitution, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 449, 472 (1971).
132. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 130. See also Mikva & Lundy, supra note 131,
at 483, quoting remarks of Representative Matsunaga: "Let us, therefore, carry out our responsibilities as Members of Congress and legislate as we deem proper and let the Court decide whether
or not we acted beyond our constitutional authority. Let us do now what we think is right."
116 CoNG. Rac. 20,159 (1970).
133. See Mikva & Lundy, supra note 131:
[Ilt must be concluded that in the rough and tumble of parliamentary debate, careful,
meticulous reasoning about matters of constitutional interpretation comes in a very
poor second to arguments of urgent necessity, debate on issues of public policy,
and-not infrequently-sheer emotion. Careful and precise legal and logical distinctions are far more difficult to make, or at least to make convincingly, on the floor
of the House than before the bench.
Id. at 459.
134. Cf. Schuck, supra note 68, at 355 (discussing relative competencies of the separate branches
of government).
135. See D. MORGAN, supra note 130; Sager, supra note 128, at 1222-28.
136. D. MORGAN, supra note 130, at 361-62, 1227; Sager, supra note 128, at 1227.
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constitutional issues problematic would only be exacerbated if zoning boards
or other elected municipal bodies were expected to anticipate the Supreme
Court's judgment on the constitutionality of municipal ordinances. First, while
Congress might be able to inform its deliberations by making more extensive
use of constitutional law experts, that option, because of its expense, may

be less available to local legislatures. Second, few local issues are more politically charged than zoning questions. Finally, because the validity of local land

use ordinances, much more than the validity of federal statutes, is likely to
turn on applications to particular cases, the difficulty of foreseeing potential
problems is multiplied.' 37
The decision to hold municipalities liable for the constitutional derelictions
of its policymakers has another aspect. Not only may those officials be poor
predictors of Supreme Court behavior, but if they do engage in Supreme Court
prediction, they may be poorer policymakers. First, they may abdicate any
attempt at independent constitutional judgment. Second, they may be more
timid as policymakers. It is this second concern that has led drafters of modern
legislation waiving government tort immunity to retain a "discretionary function" exemption.'" 8 To whatever extent a discretionary function exception is
a desirable safeguard for the policymaking process, one would expect a similar
shield from liability .for constitutional violations.
In Owen, however, the Court declined to apply the discretionary function
immunity because

137. Cf. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922) (noting that whether
a deprivation is of a nature that warrants compensation "is a question of degree-and therefore
cannot be disposed of by general propositions"). Because of the disparity of impact that even
a single land use restriction can have on various parcels, determinations of constitutionality would
require detailed study of the numerous potential applications of the restriction.
The fact situation in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 145 Cal. Rptr. 476 (1978), aff'd, 24 Cal. 3d
266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), is illustrative. In Tiburon,
a city of about 6,000 residents, the city council amended its zoning ordinance to designate certain
property for residential planned development and open space uses. The designated property included a five-acre parcel owned by Agin. The new designation limited development to a minimum
of one residence per acre. The ordinance was enacted in response to a new California statute
requiring each locality to develop an open-space plan and to take steps to preserve open spaces.
To evaluate conscientiously the constitutionality of the ordinance it enacted, the Tiburon city
council would have had to obtain both information about the impact of the ordinance on all
affected parcels and legal advice based on that information. The city's decision to hire private
consultants to prepare advisory reports on development of an open-space plan indicates that
staff resources were probably inadequate to assist the council in its evaluation of constitutionality. Moreover, even with more substantial resources or with private consultants, the cost of obtaining that information would be high and the accuracy of the data obtained would likely be
low. Considering alternative plans would likely require compilation of data from many parcels,
entailing significant cost. In addition, accuracy of calculations made by the municipality or its
agents would not be scrutinized in an adversary proceeding that would induce each opposing
party to produce relevant information favorable to its cause.
138. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982); cf. L. JAm , JuDIciAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE
AcTioN 245 (1965) (discretionary immunity for government officers grounded in part on fear
that officers would otherwise "hesitate to do what should be done").

INDIANA LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:113

a municipality has no "discretion" to violate the Federal Constitution;
its dictates are absolute and imperative. And when a court passes judgment on the municipality's conduct in a § 1983 action, it does not seek
to second-guess the "reasonableness" of the city's decision nor to interfere
with the local government's resolution of competing policy considerations.
Rather, it looks only to whether the municipality has conformed
to the
39
requirements of the Federal Constitution and statutes.'
The distinction reminds one of an earlier Court's conclusion that constitutional interpretation was merely a matter of laying the constitution next to
a challenged statute and deciding "whether the latter squares with the
former."' 0 As Professor Peter Schuck has observed, given the ambiguity of
many constitutional standards, application of those standards "necessarily involves second-guessing the discretionary decision and 'interfer[es] with the
. . . government's resolution of competing policy considerations.'
3.

Summary

The value of municipal liability as a policy tool when municipal enactments
exceed constitutional limitations depends to some degree on the goal toward
which the tool is directed. If the goal is a narrow one-to prevent municipalities
from engaging in activities defined by the Supreme Court as unconstitutionalmunicipal liability is likely to be a tool of at least marginal effectiveness. But
municipal liability may be no more than marginally effective for two reasons.
First, how municipal decisionmakers actually react to the prospect of municipal
liability is uncertain. Second, even if municipal officials react to a liability
rule by seeking to avoid liability, most municipal officials are not well suited,
by training and position, to predict accurately the course of Supreme Court
behavior on constitutional law issues.
The effectiveness of a liability rule, however, comes at the cost of additional effort by municipal officials to review their decisions for conformity
with Supreme Court decisions. By comparison, if only invalidation were
available as a remedy, municipal officials would presumably engage in less
extensive review of Supreme Court precedent, but still would be unlikely to
139. 445 U.S. 622, 649 (1980).
140. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936).
141. Schuck, supra note 68, at 354 (quoting Owen, 445 U.S. at 649).
In a footnote to his dissent in San Diego Gas, Justice Brennan queried: "After all, if a policeman
must know the Constitution, then why not a planner?" 450 U.S. 621, 661 n.26 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Professor Norman Williams has responded caustically, but not inaccurately:
In view of the record in these two cases [Agins and San Diego Gas], the obvious
reply is obvious: and why not a Supreme Court Justice? (At least on the relatively
simple question of when a controversy is ripe for decision.) Are we to anticipate
that The Court will shortly issue a standard Miranda warning for planners, which
makes it unmistakably clear in all instances what is a valid and an invalid regulation, so that planners may know? If so, we have a long way to go from the analysis
in the Grand Central case.
5 N. WILLIAMS, AmmucAN PLANNING LAW LAND USE AND THE POLICE POWER § 158.09, at 66

(Cum. Supp. 1983) (emphasis in original).
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enact patently unconstitutional ordinances. After all, enacting an ordinance
is not a costless endeavor, and if the municipality could, without great effort,
ascertain that a potential enactment would be unconstitutional, the municipality
is unlikely to incur those costs except in the instances where the municipal
purpose is merely to secure the delay attendant to an adjudication of
unconstitutionality.
In a broader context, municipal liability may not only be a costly method
for securing constitutional rights; it may also have a serious and negative impact on the policymaking process. For instance, to the extent that government liability causes policymakers to conform their decisions to Supreme Court
precedent, government liability will prevent policymakers from conducting independent constitutional review. And, in a government of separate but interdependent branches, if there is a reason to have branches other than the
judicial branch engaging in constitutional review, the reason lies in the ability
of the elected branches to bring a different perspective to constitutional ques42
tions, not in their ability to parrot Supreme Court doctrine.1
In addition, if the goal of a municipal liability rule is protection against
inefficiencies or majority oppression, a liability rule is a double-edged sword.
While a municipality liability rule might discourage policymakers from enactments that exceed constitutional limitations, it would also provide incentives
toward policymaking inaction, which could also result in inefficiency and majority oppression.
Of course, none of the foregoing discussion establishes that municipal liabili43
ty for unconstitutional action is always unwise, if, in light of section 1983'
and Owen, that question retains any practical importance. The more a constitutional norm can be reduced to hard and fast rules; and the more ministerial
the function of the official involved, the less persuasive opposition to a damage
remedy becomes.' 4 4 Moreover, municipal liability is particularly attractive when
no other remedy is available to an aggrieved party. Thus, in cases imposing
liability for unconstitutional police conduct, a municipal immunity rule might
leave injured victims without relief, especially when their own conduct has
been most innocent. But when municipal policymaking activity is involved,
especially in areas of constitutional uncertainty, a blanket rule of liability might
be overbroad.
142. See D. MORGAN, supra note 130, at 334-39. Mikva and Lundy have also justified independent constitutional review as a means of reducing interbranch confrontation. See Mikva
& Lundy, supra note 131, at 498.

143. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).

144. For instance, although constitutional police activity is an important social goal, rules
governing impermissible police activity may be framed with enough clarity that few officers will
be deterred from engaging in valuable and constitutional activity. The "Miranda warning" provides an example. By giving police explicit instruction about how to behave in particular situa-

tions, the risk of unconstitutional behavior without deterring constitutional behavior is limited.
Of course, not all rules governing police behavior can be made so explicit, and police officers
cannot usefully be treated as programmed automatons. But a large number of constitutional
problems they encounter can be reduced to rules of behavior. See generally McGowan, Rule-
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Municipal Liability for UnconstitutionalLand Use Ordinances:
Efficiency Concerns in the Land Use Context'"5

If liability were imposed as a blanket rule for all unconstitutional municipal
enactments, then money damages would of course be available to victims of
unconstitutional land use ordinances. But if a blanket liability rule is rejected,
land use ordinances would appear to be particularly inappropriate candidates
for a damage remedy. Land use policies are an important, sometimes pre-

eminent, focus for municipal policymaking. However the ordinance-imposing
activities of municipalities are categorized, whether as legislative, executive, or
administrative,' 46 the zoning and planning process requires the exercise of
discretion by municipal decisionmakers, and Supreme Court precedent provides precious little guidance to those decisionmakers.
Professor Robert Ellickson has suggested, however, that the background
against which municipal decisionmakers currently consider suburban growth

controls contains structural incentives to ignore significant social costs produced by those controls.'

7

In particular, he suggests that the structure of

the housing market frequently enables a municipality to act as a cartel, restricting the level of housing development to reap monopoly profits for the

cartel's members-those who already own homes within the municipality.'" 8

Making and the Police, 70 MICH. L. Rav. 659 (1972) (suggesting increased internal rule-making
by police as a method of avoiding extensive judicial intervention).
145. In a recent article on the efficiency implications of a damage remedy, Professors Blume
and Rubinfeld examined the impact of land use restrictions on the land market. Blume & Rubinfeld,
supra note 17. They demonstrated that the difficulties of obtaining actuarially fair insurance
can produce inefficiencies in the land market if landowners are risk averse. Id. at 582-97. Blume
and Rubinfeld suggest that a compensation remedy would provide, in effect, government-sponsored
mandatory insurance against the risks of regulation. Id. at 597-99.
Blume and Rubinfeld do not conclude, however, that a compensation remedy should always
be available. First, they recognize that the administrative costs of a broad compensation remedy
are quite high. Id. at 599-606, 609, 624. They also recognize that a compensatory remedy directed
particularly at risk-averse landowners is workable only if the risk averseness of individual landowners can be measured, a task they concede creates administrative problems of its own. Id.
As a result, after only a brief examination of the effects of a damage remedy on government
process, id. at 614-18, 620-23, they conclude:
Compensation is costly in an economic sense, measured by the administrative and
other economic costs associated with the payment of compensation. Administrative
costs can be substantial, especially when a broad compensation rule is implemented.
Finally, a compensation system that implicitly subsidizes one form of land use relative
to another can add distortions to land use decision making. These distortions are
more severe than the possible distortions due to uninsured risk. We are not prepared
at this point to work out the details necessary to apply our rule for determining
when compensation should be paid.
Id. at 624.
146. Professor Rose has recently explored some of the difficulties in categorizing the zoning
and planning process. See J. RosE, PLANNING AND DEALING: PIECEMEAL LAND CONTROLS AS A
PROBLEM OF LOCAL LEGITIMACY (19xx).
147. Ellickson, supra note 112, at 404-10.
148. Id. at 400-01, 424-35.
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Ellickson concludes that damage liability could reduce this inefficiency of
monopoly power in a way that injunctive relief cannot. 149 To the extent
Ellickson is right that market structure creates a systematic bias for officials
to enact inefficient controls, and to the extent that structure extends to land
use restrictions other than suburban growth controls, Ellickson's conclusion
deserves careful examination. His model, therefore, serves as a primary focus
in this section.
1. Ellickson's Model
In his article, Professor Ellickson mounts an attack on the use by suburban
officials of land use controls-excessive minimum lot sizes and building standards, development charges, quotas on construction-to prevent or limit
growth within the municipality. Ellickson's attack is based in part on equitable
concerns,' 0 but also on the inefficiencies created by such controls.'
Ellickson demonstrates that a suburb without perfect substitutes for housing consumers, but with the power to enact zoning controls, has a degree
of monopoly power in the marketplace. To the extent that municipal officials
act, in effect, as agents for a homeowner cartel, the municipality, like other
monopolists, has the power to increase the market price for its residential
housing product by limiting production.' 52 (See Fig. 1.) The municipality would
maximize revenue for the homeowner cartel by assuring that housing production was at the level (Qg) where marginal revenue equals marginal cost. Production would be lower and housing prices higher than if production were
expanded to the point (Qe), the competitive equilibrium point, at which demand and marginal cost are equal. As a result, although more housing could
be built at a cost lower than the maximum consumers are willing to pay,
that additional housing would not be built. The resulting inefficiency,' 53 the
inefficiency of monopoly power, leads Ellickson to seek solutions that more
closely approximate a competitive equilibrium.
As one remedy, Ellickson suggests an award of damages to housing buyers
whenever excessive growth restrictions increase the price of housing above
the competitive equilibrium price (Pe). The damage remedy, so computed,
eliminates the incentive to price higher than the competitive equilibrium price,
149. Id. at 437.

150. Id. at 450-65. Ellickson notes that legal rules governing municipal taxation and provision
of services serve to redistribute wealth. He concludes that those rules should "ensure that the
beneficiaries and victims of municipal wealth redistribution programs are determined in a horizontally fair manner." Id. at 454.
151. Id. at 424-50.
152. In fact, the motivation of the homeowners may be not simply to increase the market
price for their product, but more to impose price restrictions on entry into the community as
a means of excluding "undesirable" neighbors. Whatever the motivation, a homeowner cartel
would be able to increase the market price for residential housing under Ellickson's model.
153. The competitive equilibrium point is probably, although not necessarily, Pareto-superior
to the monopoly equilibrium point. See infra note 175.
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and causes the municipality to abandon its growth restriction, unless restricting growth is, in itself, so important to the municipality that it warrants absorbing the monetary loss that will result. At the competitive equilibrium point,
the demand for housing equals the cost of producing it, eliminating any inefficiencies of monopoly power.
2.

The Ellickson Model and Constitutional Review

Ellickson does not suggest that constitutional restrictions on land use enactments be transformed into a never-ending quest for competitive equilibrium.
Instead he begins with the premise that land use restrictions are valid without
compensation if the restrictions are "harm-preventing" or alternatively, if the
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fairness test developed by Professor Frank Michelman can be met.," 4 Restric-

tions which are not "harm-preventing" and which fail the Michelman fairness
test, by contrast, are unconstitutional and qualify for Ellickson's damage
remedy. Ellickson contends that there is an ascertainable difference between
restrictions that prevent harm and those that confer benefits, and defines a

harmful land use activity as "one that falls below the standards normally
met by landowners.''"55

Ellickson himself concedes that there are difficulties with his formulation.
First, land uses may be different in kind, but difficult to assess for relative
quality, especially when the disparity in type of use is sufficiently great. For

instance, to what extent is a luxury apartment building "below the standards
normally met by landowners" in an area dominated by modest two-family
homes? But even assuming that quality comparisons are possible, Ellickson
does not explain his choice of the median quality of existing land uses as
the standard by which future land uses are to be judged. In a sense, any new
development which is more attractive than the worst existing use, but less
attractive than the best existing use, has the potential for both conferring
15 6
benefits and causing harm to different segments of the community.
Moreover, Ellickson's basic premise that land use restrictions without compensation ought to be permissible only when the restrictions are harm57
preventing has little support in judicial precedent or scholarly commentary.

154. Ellickson, supra note 112, at 419-20. Ellickson qualifies his formulation somewhat: "When
the challenged ordinance is one that restricts nuisance activities, a landowner should be able
to prevail on a taking claim only when he can prove that the ordinance is grossly inefficientthat is, that its costs vastly exceed its benefits." Id.at 419.
Ellickson does not argue, however, that the ordinance should be deemed a taking if the cost
to the landowners exceeds the benefit; he is concerned with all costs and benefits.
155. Id. at 422.
156. For instance, in an undeveloped tract between a rundown slum and one-family homes
on quarter-acre lots, a mobile home park or a development of prefabricated homes may be either
a welcome addition or an unwanted scourge depending on one's perspective.
157. In support of the harm/benefit test, Ellickson cites FREUND, TBE POLICE POwER 546-47
(1904) and Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58 CoLUM. L. Rv. 650,
663-69 (1958). He notes criticism of this view in Michelrnan, supra note 100, at 1196-1201, 1235-45,
and Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problems, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 165, 172-75 (1974).
Ellickson, supra note 112, at 419 n.89.
For another criticism of attempts to embrace all takings law in simple formulations, and for
criticism in particular of the Ellickson approach, see Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the
Accommodation Power: Antidotesfor the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies,75 Cozttm.
L. REv. 1021, 1024-33 (1975). In particular Professor Costonis notes: "Even Procrustes, I suspect,
would shrink from confronting with a single measuring rod areas as diverse as growth management resource protection, incentive zoning, aircraft overflight, interim zoning and nonconforming use amortization; and these are only a few of the contexts whose unique features so complicate the compensation question." Id. at 1026.
Judicial treatment of the harm/benefit test has been no more kind. In Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), Justice Rehnquist's dissent advocated a modified
nuisance-based test. Id. at 146 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Like Professor Ellickson, Justice Rehnquist was willing to concede the propriety of non-nuisance based restrictions where the regulatory
scheme creates an "average reciprocity of advantage." Id. at 147. But Justice Rehnquist's analysis
was rejected by a six-member majority of the Court. Id. at 133-34 & n.30.
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Whatever the merits of Ellickson's criteria, if courts continue to make decisions about constitutionality without reference to the criteria, adoption of
Ellickson's proposed damage remedy will not have the effect Ellickson seeks.
3.

Difficulties with Ellickson's Model

Even if courts were to apply Ellickson's own constitutional standards to
all land use ordinances, efficiency would not necessarily be promoted by universal application of a damage remedy. First, as Ellickson himself recognizes,
his analysis of suburban growth controls is not entirely adaptable to all
municipalities or to all forms of land use control.' 58 Ellickson's model assumes
a municipality in which all or nearly all voters are homeowners and in which,
on any individual issue, the majority rules.' 59 Ellickson contends that the
assumption of majoritarian control is reasonable for many suburban communities, but recognizes that it is less plausible in other municipalities. 6 Finally, even in municipalities that are ruled largely by the preferences of a majority of homeowners, not all land use controls present the same potential
for abuse of monopoly power as suburban growth controls. 6 '
Moreover, even on its own terms, Ellickson's analysis is not without difficulties. This section explores three such difficulties.
a.

The Harm/Benefit Dichotomy

Ellickson's efficiency discussion starts with the premise that restrictions on
harm-producing land uses are unconstitutional unless they meet the Michelman
fairness test. Ellickson does not purport to ground that suggested constitutional standard in efficiency considerations. Yet his entire efficiency discussion is dependent on his harm/benefit distinction which, if applied, might
itself encourage an inefficient level of development.
158. Ellickson, supra note 112, at 409-10.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 404-10.
161. For instance, landmark regulation may not be subject to the monopoly power abuses
involved when a suburb attempts to restrict growth. Landmark preservation is likely to proceed
on a highly individualized basis, making it more difficult for the municipality to control the
aggregate supply of new construction by adjusting its landmarks policy.
In addition the number of candidates for landmark restrictions in any municipality is probably
a small percentage of the total number of sites developed or available for development. But
cf. Richland, The Case for Tightening the Reins on Landmarking, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1982,
§ 8 (Real Estate), at 1, col. 3, with Menapace, Landmark Authority Is Wisely Applied, N.Y.
Times, March 7, 1982, § 8 (Real Estate), at 1, col. 6 (expressing differing views on the effect
existing landmark regulations have on development in New York City). Therefore, even liberal
use of landmark restrictions is not likely to have a substantial effect on growth in the municipality. Moreover, a landmark preservation scheme is likely to be unconstitutional for failing to advance a public purpose if landmarks are chosen based on the likelihood that the restrictions
will maximize revenues of existing homeowner members of the cartel. Cf. Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed
and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
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Let us accept Ellickson's hypothesis of a suburb without perfect substitutes,
and with a demand curve for housing (DD') that is downwardly sloped. (See
Fig. 1.) The supply curve for used housing (UL) is vertical, illustrating the
inelasticity of that supply. The supply curve for new housing (SS') is a traditional, upwardly sloped curve. The aggregate supply curve (UVH) then, is
the sum of the supply of new housing and of used housing at any given price.
The suburb's marginal revenue curve (MM') is located below the demand curve.
Ellickson argues that, absent congestion costs and presumably other externalities, the most efficient level of housing production is Qe, the quantity
of housing produced at the point where the market supply curve intersects
the market demand curve.' 62 To the extent that a suburban municipality can
act as a monopoly cartel, it will restrict housing production to Qg, the quantity of housing produced at the point where the supply curve intersects the
cartel's marginal revenue curve. At the Qg level of production, Ellickson
argues, there is a deadweight social loss of GEK. Additional housing will not
be produced, even though at every quantity between Qg and Qe consumers
would be willing to pay more for an additional unit of housing than the unit
would cost. To eliminate the loss, Ellickson proposes a damage remedy for
consumers. If home buyers were entitled to recover from the municipality
the difference between the monopoly-engineered price of housing and the
equilibrium price (Pg-Pe), the cartel's financial incentive to restrict housing
production would be eliminated. Removing that incentive, Ellickson suggests,
would result in an increase in housing production to the efficient equilibrium
point.' 6 3
In constructing his efficiency argument, however, Ellickson ignores his own
premise that municipalities are entitled to restrict without compensation "harmproducing" land uses. But some, perhaps much, of the demand for housing
in the municipality is likely to be for housing that meets Ellickson's criterion
for harm-producing uses-uses below the standards usually met by landowners.
For instance, if housing demand in a suburb of single family homes is in
some measure demand for apartments, Ellickson's test would permit the
municipality to forbid apartment development. That prohibition, however,
would reduce production and increase housing prices just as surely as development restrictions that are not "harm-producing."
Assume, for instance, that Ellickson's "harm-producing" standard would
permit the municipality to limit production to Qj. That limitation would cause
inefficiency in the sense that every additional unit of production between Qi
and Qe would cost less to produce than consumers would be willing to pay
for it. This inefficiency is apparently one Ellickson is willing to accept. But
once that inefficency is accepted, Ellickson's model no longer rests on efficiency considerations alone; distributional concerns have been introduced. At

162. See Ellickson, supra note 112, at 431, 436.
163. Id. at 436-38.
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that point, if one does not accept Ellickson's distributional notions, in particular his harm/benefit formulation, his damages model is less persuasive.
In terms of Ellickson's model, there are two alternatives. Consumers harmed
by growth controls may be awarded either Pg-P or Pg-Pj. If they are awarded
Pg'Pe, the municipality will, in effect, be precluded from imposing any land
use restrictions, whether they confer benefits or prevent harm, without compensating consumers for the resulting increase in housing prices. That result
runs contrary both to Ellickson's premise and to established law. If consumers
are awarded Pg-Pj the remedy is not grounded on efficiency considerations
but on the conclusion that the municipality is entitled, on nonefficiency
grounds, to restrict production to P. At that point the crucial step becomes
the location of P. Only if one accepts the Ellickson harm/benefit formulation would one locate Pj where Ellickson does. And Ellickson never contends
that the harm/benefit formulation rests on economic efficiency grounds.
In sum, Ellickson's argument is a bit schizophrenic. If his damage remedy
is designed to eliminate land use restrictions that are not economically efficient, it cannot achieve that goal and at the same time preserve the municipality's right to impose, without compensation, "harm-producing" land use restrictions. On the other hand, if the municipality has a right to restrict some uses
of land without compensation, the measure of Ellickson's consumer damages
remedy depends not on considerations of economic efficiency, but on the imprecise point at which the municipality's land use regulatory power ends. That
point cannot be determined on efficiency grounds.
b.

The Irreversibility of Growth-Promoting Decisions

Ellickson would award damages against a municipality to encourage development policies that permit continued growth so long as the market demand
exceeds the cost of supplying new housing. However sound that object might
be with respect to most goods, the relative difficulty of reversing a decision
to permit municipal growth makes undue focus on the current competitive
equilibrium undesirable.
All decisions about the use of resources are, in a sense, irreversible. A decision to produce more soap, for instance, precludes using the resources consumed in the soap-making process for other purposes. When the basic economic
question is whether to devote resources to capital formation or to current
consumption, this permanent loss of resources is significant. When, however,
the choice is current consumption of soap or current consumption of
toothpaste, the future consequences of the decision are small. If consumer
preferences change, the economic system can readily adapt to produce more
toothpaste and less soap. A decision by today's consumers does not foreclose
a different choice for tomorrow.
The same reversibility does not exist with decisions to permit municipal
growth. Most residential, commercial and industrial construction has a lifespan
sufficiently long to preclude future generations from making a choice between
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development and open spaces, even if their preferences are significantly different. Before land is developed, the decision to be faced is whether the land
is worth as much to the community for open spaces as it is to developers
for construction. Once land has been developed, however, a community that
wants open space must evaluate its desire not only against the cost of the
land, but also against the value of the improvements and the cost of their
demolition.' 6 Moreover, while a community can decide to develop incrementally, a decision to "undevelop" would involve massive and rapid upheaval.
It is true that the lost potential for vacant land in the future is an element
of the cost of developing land in the present. In that sense, the current market
equilibrium reflects the potential loss of options in the future. But the market
reflects the potential loss of options to current consumers, not to future
generations. 6 5 If the market is used as a standard, costs to be incurred in
the future are likely to be discounted heavily, raising significant questions
of intergenerational fairness. 166 And beyond the market's inadequacy for addressing intergenerational conflicts, even assessing future preferences is a task
fraught with uncertainties. Especially if future preferences turn out to be vastly
different from those of the present, a current decision to develop land could
entail costs not reflected in the price and not felt for years to come.
Moreover, some development decisions may not be reversible even if future
generations are willing to absorb great expense to reverse them. Landmarks,
once destroyed, can never be recaptured. Decisions to develop wilderness areas,
or otherwise to upset ecological balances, cannot easily be reversed even upon
payment of money. A municipality that permits development at the expense
of the natural environment binds future generations to present preferences.
The irreversibility problem does not suggest that a damage remedy is any
less efficient than declaratory relief. Instead, it indicates that attempting to
reach the competitive equilibrium point by either method can be shortsighted.
Because development decisions have long-term implications, some of them
irreversible, there may be long-run diseconomies in permitting development
at the competitive equilibrium level. This problem raises questions about the
competitive equilibrium level as a goal, not merely about the consumer damage
remedy as a means of reaching that goal.
c.

The Judicial Costs of the Ellickson Damage Remedy

Although Professor Ellickson concedes that his proposed consumer damage
remedy presents "intimidating" problems of measurement, he concludes that
164. Of course, the same evaluation must be made if the society decides to produce less soap:
soap-making machines must be destroyed or converted to other uses. But to the extent that building
construction has a particularly long contemplated useful life, the problem is exacerbated. Soapmaking machines, twenty years after their initial manufacture, probably retain a much smallel
percentage of their initial value than do office buildings.
165. See generally J. KaRTrLLA & A. FISHmR, Tnm ECONOIMCS OF NATuRAL EImoNmETrs (1975)
(chapter 4 is especially helpful); T. PAGE, CONSERVATION AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY ch. 7 (1977).
166. See sources cited supranote 165; see also J. RAwvs, A THEORY OF JusncE 284-93 (1971).
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the difficulties are not unique and analogizes them to the problems of consumer antitrust actions.1 6 7 If the argument, however, is that the damage remedy
is the most efficient remedy for overly restrictive land use controls, comparison
ought to be drawn not with consumer antitrust actions but with declaratory
relief against the municipality. In two respects, providing consumers, or even
landowners, with a damage remedy entails costs not present when the only
available remedy is declaratory relief. First, as Ellickson recognizes, computing
damages is a formidable task, especially if the Ellickson formula is used. 16
Second, because the municipality will often prefer removing its restriction to
paying any significant damage award, computing and awarding damages as
soon as the land use restriction is found to be unduly restrictive will frequently result in greater expenditure of judicial effort than if declaratory relief alone
69
were available.'
Professor Ellickson never details a method for computing and distributing
consumer damage awards in growth control cases. Instead, he indicates both
that the award "must inevitably be a gross approximation"' 7" and that "[t]he
administrative costs of calculating and distributing shares of the aggregate
damage award to individual housing consumers would usually be unacceptably high."' 7 ' As an alternative, Ellickson suggests using the award to defray
attorneys' fees and to compensate those who can prove'substantial injury,
with the balance of the award to escheat to the state. '" This suggestion reduces
to some degree the difficulties of calculation, although the difficulties that
remain are formidable enough. A court would still have to determine the
municipality's equilibrium point and the extent to which growth restrictions
raised housing prices above the equilibrium price. These determinations are
likely to be much more difficult than in private consumers' antitrust cases
because both the new and the used housing markets must be taken into account, and measuring the impact on existing housing may be possible only
over a period of several years as that housing turns over.
If engaging in the complicated damage computations were necessary to reach
the efficient market equilibrium point, perhaps the expenditure of judicial
effort to get to that point would be warranted. But by Ellickson's own
hypothesis, in the typical case, a municipality faced with the alternative of
a damage recovery would remove the restrictions, thereby raising housing production to the equilibrium point.' 73 That same result could be reached by
167. Ellickson, supra note 112, at 438.
168. Id. at 438, 500.
169. The counter-argument is that knowledge of the size of a damage award would enable
the municipality to decide more intelligently whether to remove the restrictions or pay the award.
But if the municipality knows that maintaining the restriction will require payment to affected
landowners, and if it believes the question is a close one, the municipality is capable of making
its own estimate of damages. By contrast, when the decision is an easy one for the municipality,
requiring judicial computation of damages would require a needless expenditure of resources.
170. Ellickson, supra note 112, at 500.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Indeed, that is the purpose of the damage remedy. See id. at 435-38.
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declaring invalid any restrictions that reduced production to a level below
Qe. The declaratory alternative would require no complex damage computation. Professor Ellickson suggests that the damage approach offers the
municipality greater flexibility in cases where congestion costs or other factors would cause a municipality to absorb a damage recovery rather than lifting the growth restrictions. Even if declaratory relief were awarded, however,
the municipality would retain the right to impose restrictions by use of its
eminent domain power. The valuation problem would then, of course, have
to be faced, but only in those cases where the municipality indicates its willingness to pay to maintain its restrictions, not in every growth restriction case.
Where it is patent that the municipality would withdraw the restriction rather
than pay for it, declaratory relief would avoid the valuation problem. 74
If the costs of arriving at a damage award are high, there is no persuasive
efficiency reason for preferring damages to declaratory relief. The competitive
equilibrium point can be reached either by use of a damage remedy or by
resort to declaratory relief. In most cases, that point will be reached at less
judicial cost by providing a declaratory remedy.
4.

Summary

The Ellickson model provides a framework for analyzing the efficiency of
suburban growth controls in municipalities with some monopoly power. The
model suggests the efficiency advantages of moving from the monopoly
equilibrium position to the competitive equilibrium point.'7 5 There are,
however, difficulties with Ellickson's conclusion that a consumer damage
remedy is the most efficient redress for overzealous growth controls. Most
174. See supra text accompanying note 169.
175. Underlying the Ellickson model is the assumption that, at least in the absence of congestion costs or other externalities, the level of production at the competitive equilibrium point
is more efficient than at the monopoly equilibrium point. While that assumption is probably
correct, it merits at least brief discussion.
A move from the monopoly equilibrium point to the competitive equilibrium point will reduce
the profits of the monopolist, making the monopolist worse off. To satisfy the Pareto-superior
conception of efficiency, the move to competitive equilibrium would not be efficient unless the
monopolist could be made no worse off than he was before the move. Because the total dollar
value of production at the competitive equilibrium point is greater than that at the monopoly
equilibrium point, the monopolist could be compensated for his losses while leaving all others
better off, unless the costs of redistribution to the monopolist exceed the gains from moving
to competitive equilibrium. Even if the costs of redistribution were high, competitive equilibrium
may be desired because the monopolist's profits are considered "illegitimate" in some sense and
therefore not entitled to protection. But, the move to the competitive equilibrium point would
not be a Pareto-superior move.
In the case of suburban growth controls, the cost of redistribution is not likely to be great.
As Professor Ellickson demonstrates, many municipalities have become expert at tailoring development charges to recapture as much developer and consumer surplus as is possible. See Ellickson,
supra note 112, at 394-99, 477-98. Given that expertise, the municipal cartel may feasibly recover
enough surplus to compensate for its loss of monopoly profits. Of course, establishing that the
competitive equilibrium point is more efficient does not require that such compensation be made;
it requires only that the compensation be feasible.
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evident is his cavalier treatment of the complexity of computing damages.
Perhaps more fundamental, however, are two other weaknesses in his
argument-first, the inconsistency between seeking to reach competitive
equilibrium and permitting all "harm-preventing" regulation, and second, his
failure to account for irreversibility of the decision to develop previously
undeveloped land. These difficulties undercut both Ellickson's conclusion that
development policy should seek development at the competitive equilibrium
level and his conclusion that a consumer damage remedy is the most efficient
way to reach that level.
Despite the difficulties with the Ellickson model, it does highlight one recurring concern about the municipal decisionmaking process. The effects of
municipal decisions frequently extend beyond the constituents to whom
municipal officials are ultimately responsible. If one believes that municipal
officials systematically ignore the external effects of their decisions, one might
want to impose institutional checks on their behavior, checks not imposed
on state or federal officials. But a municipal liability rule is not the only possible check, nor is it necessarily the best one. For instance, the New Jersey
Supreme Court, in the Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township
of Mount Laurel litigation, 76 has dealt with an externality problem without
imposing a rule of municipal liability. Other states have transferred some
aspects of land use regulation from localities to the state.' 77 Thus, even without
a federal constitutional remedy, state legislatures and courts have both the
capacity and the incentive to deal with the externalities municipal land use
decisions might create.
State decisionmakers also make decisions with external impact. If liability
is not imposed on the states when their unconstitutional decisions were
motivated by disregard for external effects, the case for imposing an externalitybased liability on municipalities as a matter of federal constitutional law, is
less than compelling. " In short, none of the concerns about inadequacies
176. In Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151,
336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975), the New Jersey court

concluded that each developing municipality was obligated to provide an opportunity for construction of its "fair share" of the regional need for low and moderate income housing. Id.
at 174, 336 A.2d at 724-25. In Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount
Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983), the court expanded upon the sanctions that might
accompany a municipality's failure to comply with its fair share obligation, including judicial
orders instructing the municipality to adopt particular amendments to its zoning ordinance or
requiring approval of certain developments even if not in compliance with existing ordinances.
Id. at 285-93, 456 A.2d at 455-59.
177. Land use control in Hawaii is exercised at the state level. See HAWAII Rav. STAT. § 205-1
(1976). Of course, a number of states exert considerable control at the state level. See, e.g.,
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6001-6092 (1973 & Supp. 1983). Cf. South Burlington County NAACP
v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 177, 336 A.2d 713, 726 (1975) ("when regulation
[has] a substantial external impact, the welfare of the state's citizens beyond the borders of the
particular municipality cannot be disregarded and must be recognized and served").
178. By comparison, in a different but parallel context, it has been suggested that the privileges
and immunities clause of the Constitution may provide greater protection against discrimination
by states than against discrimination by local governments. See Massachusetts Council of Constr.
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in the municipal policymaking process justify a federally-imposed damage
remedy for constitutional violations unless a similar remedy is imposed on
other government entities as well.

V.

SYNTHESIS

Not all losses give rise to legal redress, and, more to the point of this article, not all losses give rise to the remedy of money damages. It could hardly
be otherwise.'" 9
There are two potential justifications for awarding damages. First, damage
liability may internalize externalities by imposing upon potential actors all
of the costs of their actions. In other words, damage liability may discourage
potential loss-causers from taking actions that would cause loss. Second, a
damage remedy may be used to compensate those injured by the loss-causing
activity of others, either because the loss-causing acts were wrong in some
moral sense, or because regardless of the rightness of the loss-causing activity, the losses could best be spread by imposing liability on the party who
engages in loss-causing activity. The two justifications are not, of course,
mutually exclusive.
The issue in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego,"'0 was
whether a municipality that has enacted an unconstitutional land use restriction should be liable for the damages caused to restricted landowners up to
the time the enactment was invalidated. If a damage remedy is designed to
internalize the effects of municipal decisions, the design raises several questions. A preliminary question is whether municipal liability has sufficient impact on municipal decisionmakers to approximate internalization of the costs
of municipal decisions. But even if municipal decisionmakers protect the
municipal coffers as they would their own, a rule that internalizes only the
costs of one form of municipal action-enactment of ordinances that violate
the Federal Constitution-could distort the policymaking process. And the
potential for distortion is greatest when municipal decisionmakers have little
capacity to decipher the Supreme Court's constitutional pronouncements. Constitutional limits on land use regulations are not drawn in bright lines. And
municipal policymakers are not, by experience or training, likely to be wellversed in constitutional decisionmaking. As a result, to whatever extent a
municipal liability rule does reduce constitutional infringement, and the extent may not be great, the reduction will come at a cost to the policymaking
process.

Employers v. Mayor of Boston, 384 Mass. 466, 478, 425 N.E.2d 346, 354 (1981), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204, 214
n.12 (1983).
179. After all, the mere payment of a money judgment constitutes a loss to the party forced
to pay, which could not be compensated without creating still other losses.
180. 450 U.S. 621 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Awarding damages whenever an unconstitutional ordinance is enacted is
also troublesome from a compensation perspective. The constitutional proscription is one based not on moral fault, but rather on the desirability of
spreading the costs of a government acting for the benefit of all. If a landowner is limited to judicial invalidation as a remedy, the costs of delay in
securing an adjudication of rights are concentrated on the landowner seeking
vindication.
Delays caused by earnest evaluation of difficult legal and factual questions
may be common enough to assume that rough justice is accomplished even
when no individual delay is compensated. However, if government delays
caused by official efforts to postpone or discourage exercise of known legal
rights are sufficiently less common, then to leave the resulting losses uncompensated might be to single out the victims of those delays for different and less
favorable treatment than others in society. To the extent that there is no good
reason to single out these victims, compensation is appropriate to spread their
losses.
Concerns about distorting the policymaking process would be diminished
if municipal liability were to attach only when officials disregard constitutional presumptions they "know" to be applicable. If one were able to determine accurately when municipal officials knowingly violate constitutional
rights, imposing damages only in these cases would not constrain the behavior
of officials discharging their policymaking responsibilities in areas of less certain constitutional boundaries. Of course, the uncertainty of a standard that
relies on the decisionmaker's knowledge might still make some policymakers
timid. But in the case of knowing violations of the Constitution, municipal
liability may be the most palatable alternative. After all, when policymakers
effectuate a policy they know the courts will strike down, the end they seek
is delay. Declaratory and injunctive relief furnish no protection against such
intentional delay of a declaration of unconstitutionality. Moreover, when the
end sought by government is delay, declaratory or injunctive relief furnishes
no protection against government abuse. A New York case, Keystone
Associates v. State,' 8 ' furnishes an example.
To preserve the old Metropolitan Opera House after the Opera had moved
to its new quarters in Lincoln Center, the state legislature enacted a statute
vesting a private corporation with the power to condemn the Opera House
property.182 The legislation also authorized the New York City Superintendent of Buildings to refuse a demolition permit for 180 days upon request
of the trustees of the private corporation and a deposit of $200,000 for security
in case the property was never condemned.' 83 By this device, the legislature
bought time for the private corporation to raise money to condemn the Opera
181. 39 A.D.2d 176, 333 N.Y.S.2d 27 (1972), aff'd, 33 N.Y.2d 848, 307 N.E.2d 254, 352
N.Y.S.2d 194 (1973).
182. See Keystone Assocs. v. Moerdler, 19 N.Y.2d 78, 85, 224 N.E.2d 700, 701, 278 N.Y.S.2d
185, 187 (1966).
183. Id.
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House. In a suit against the state for damages suffered in the period between
the statute's enactment and a declaration of its invalidity, the court of appeals held that damages were an appropriate remedy.'"
In Keystone Associates, the heart of the government abuse involved was
the attempt to delay the landowner from proceeding with development.
Declaratory or injunctive relief would provide little protection against this
form of abuse, because the delays attendant to litigating the landowners' claim
would secure for the government precisely the result it sought. Damages were
necessary to provide protection against this form of government abuse.' 8
Moreover, an award of damages in the Keystone Associates case would
be unlikely to instill fear in government policymakers who are considering
land use measures of undetermined constitutionality. Delay was the explicit
purpose of the Opera House legislation; the legislature expressed no doubt
that the Opera House could not be preserved, ultimately, without payment
of compensation. If damages were limited to cases where land use regulations
attempt so blatantly to obstruct or delay the exercise of conceded constitutional rights, policymakers would have few worries when considering issues
that raise bona fide constitutional questions.
Damages, then, are justified when landowner losses are caused by government actions that delay or discourage vindication of constitutional rights that
are or should be beyond dispute. By contrast, because of the distortions in
the policymaking process that damages might cause, especially at the local
184. Keystone Assocs. v. State, 33 N.Y.2d 848, 307 N.E.2d 254, 352 N.Y.S.2d 194 (1973).
185. See also Lomarch Corp. v. Mayor of Englewood, 51 N.J. 108, 237 A.2d 881 (1968) (one
year freeze on development).
"Condemnation blight," injury caused by preliminary government steps toward ultimate condemnation, may also require a damage remedy on similar grounds. To the extent that the government's goal is to depress the price it has to pay for land it wants to condemn, failure to provide
damages, either in the ultimate eminent domain proceeding or-in a separate proceeding, would
permit the government abuse to go unremedied. Some courts have held that an award for condemnation blight should be included in the ultimate eminent domain award. See, e.g., City of
Buffalo v. J.W. Clement Co., 28 N.Y.2d 241, 269 N.E.2d 895, 321 N.Y.S.2d 345 (1971); Lange
v. State, 86 Wash. 2d 585, 547 P.2d 282 (1976). Other courts have awarded damages for condemnation blight separately. See, e.g., Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Mich.
1966), aff'd, 405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968); Textron, Inc. v. Wood, 167 Conn. 334, 355 A.2d
307 (1974).
In other circumstances, the government may ultimately decide not to comdemn, sometimes
after it has deferred decision for so long that productive use of the land is paralyzed. The resulting
dilemma is summarized in Drakes Bay Land Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 574, 586 (Ct. Cl. 1970):
[P]laintiff remains without a market for its land. The private sector is not interested,
understandably, because of the well publicized threat of eventual condemnation
.... The public sector ... is not interested because after having successfully
thwarted plaintiff's subdivision plans, it realizes that plaintiff is a party who can
be deferred interminably, and dealt with at pleasure.
Again, declaratory relief provides no protection against the government abuse involved-the attempt to delay.
Other cases awarding compensation even when the governmental entity has not formally condemned the property include: Benenson v. United States, 548 F.2d 939 (Ct. Cl. 1977); Washington
Mkt. Enters. v. City of Trenton, 68 N.J. 107, 343 A.2d 408 (1975); Lincoln Loan Co. v. State,
545 P.2d 105 (Or. 1976).
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level, damages are not appropriate when unconstitutional ordinances are
enacted by municipal officials who are, within reason, unaware or unconvinced of the constitutional infirmity.
Translating those conclusions into a framework for adjudications of landowners' rights presents a host of difficulties. Official motivation is rarely as
transparent as it was in the Metropolitan Opera House legislation. Requiring
landowners to bear the burden of proving that officials acted with knowledge
of constitutional infirmity might substantially limit the number of recoveries.
On the other hand, if the municipality were required to prove the state of
mind with which its officials acted, a task always difficult but even more so
when multiple officials with potentially different motivations are involved,
damage awards might be frequent enough to chill the ardor with which
municipal officials exercise their policymaking responsibilities.
The difficulty in formulating standards for municipal liability that adequately
reflect the competing policy concerns suggests that the Supreme Court should
be cautious in adopting any universal rules that would rigidify doctrine before
the consequences of rigid doctrinal rules are more fully appreciated. Almost
every state in the Union has a state constitutional prohibition against taking
property without just compensation,'I" enforceable by whatever state remedies
the state supreme court chooses. Moreover, an individual state could choose
to enforce even the federal constitutional provisions by awarding any adequate remedy, including money damages, even if the Supreme Court concluded that damages were not constitutionally required.' 87 Collectively, the
state courts can hear, analyze, and decide many more cases on the question
than can the Supreme Court. Premature resolution of the issue on broad terms
by the Supreme Court can only stifle analysis in an area where existing analysis
is incompletely developed.
CONCLUSION

In a society that prides itself on a constitutional system, remedial deficiencies are intolerable if they leave constitutional rights unvindicated. But many
constitutional rights can be vindicated in more than one way. Respect for
the Constitution does not require availability of the remedy most likely to
produce zealous enforcement of constitutional rights or most likely to satisfy
186. See I NicHoLs, THE LAw oF EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.3 at 1-91 (J. Sackman rev. 3d ed.
1981), indicating that only North Carolina, New Hampshire, and Kansas have constitutions that
lack express prohibitions against takings of property without just compensation. In New Hampshire and Kansas, however, the state constitution has been construed to include a compensation
requirement. See Buckwalter v. School Dist. No. 42, 65 Kan. 603, 70 P. 605, 607 (1902); In
re Opinion of the Justices, 66 N.H. 629, 33 A. 1076 (1891). In North Carolina, protection is
purely statutory. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 40A-62 to 69 (1984).
187. See Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Supervisory Power, 69 COLuM. L. Rsv. 181, 184-90
(1969).
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those affected by constitutional violations. Persons charged with the responsibility of governing, at every level, have duties to perform other than enforcement of the Constitution. Zealous preoccupation with constitutional rights
by these officials, at the expense of their other duties, could lead to unresponsive, ineffective government-an evil the Constitution itself was designed to
avoid. The result might be to sacrifice the balance of constitutional government to a chimera of constitutional purity.

